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Picketing as Free Speech: The Thornhill Doctrine Reexamined
With the decision of the Supreme Court in Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co.,' a reappraisal of the constitutional protection guaranteed picketing as free speech becomes appropriate 2 The Giboney case is another in
the line of decisions resulting from attempts by organized labor to unionize
independent vendors engaged in the distribution of food and allied consumer goods.3 In the Giboney case, the Empire Co. was a wholesale ice
distributor which sold exclusively to independent vendors. 4 The union was
engaged in an effort to unionize the vendors; one of its objectives was
the improvement of working conditions of helpers employed by the vendors.
All other wholesale ice distributors in Kansas City had agreed to stop supplying non-union vendors; only Empire resisted. The union picketed Empire, and as a result, truck drivers who were members of other unions,
apparently influenced by the threat of union penalties,5 refused to cross the
picket line. Empire successfully sought an injunction against all picketing
on the theory that its purpose was to force Empire to become a party to
an unlawful combination in restraint of trade, and thus to violate the
Missouri Anti-Trust Statute.6
The injunction was successively sustained by the Missouri Supreme
Court 7 and the U. S. Supreme Court. The latter Court, in a unanimous
decision, held that picketing used as an essential and inseparable part of
a grave offense against an important public law is not constitutionally protected. The opinion of Justice Black stressed the use of union sanctions,
labeling the picketing as more than an exercise of free speech.
The purpose of this Note is to reexamine the extent of the constitutional protection afforded peaceful picketing in the light of the Giboney case.
A number
of recent state cases, and cases arising under the Taft-Hartley
Act,8 provide material for an examination of how the courts are in fact
drawing the line between the states' and Congress' power to regulate economic affairs, on the one hand, and labor's right of free expression, on
the other.
NON-SPEECH ASPECTS OF PICKETING

The constitutional protection afforded picketing as free speech clearly
applies only to peaceful picketing. In Thornhill v. Alabama,9 the case
which first extended the protection of the 14th Amendment to picketing,
1. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).

2. See Jaffe, In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 MIcH.
L. REv. 1037 (1943); Teller, Picketing mnd Free Speech, 56 H~Av. L. REv. 180
(1942) ; Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 H. v. L. REv. 513 (1943) ;
Teller, Picketing and Free Speech: A Reply, 56 HAav. L. REv. 532 (1943); Note,
Peaceful Picketing and the Constitutional Guarantee of Free Speech Since the Swing
Case, 90 U. OF PA. L. REV. 201 (1941).

3. Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
4. Only 15-20% of Empire's business was derived from the sale of ice. Empire
operated a cold storage warehouse as its major activity.
5. 336 U.S. 490, 493, 503 (1949).
6. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN., § 8301 (1939).
7. 357 Mo. 671, 210 S.W.2d 55 (1948).
8. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (Supp. 1947).
references to the Taft-Hartley Act will be by section only.

9. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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the Supreme Court emphasized that mass picketing and violence were not
constitutionally protected activities. 10
Picketing as Patrol.-Mr.Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion
in Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl," stated:
"Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since
it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence
of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence,
those aspects of picketing make it the subject of restrictive regulation."
Courts and writers have differed sharply in their interpretation of this
dictum. One commentator has argued with force that because of its patrol
aspects, picketing is essentially non-speech in that it appeals to sympathy
2
However, this arguor embarrassment or to obedience to a union rule.'
ment proves too much, since much of what is traditionally regarded as
speech is effective because of similar appeals. 13 People can not be shielded
from the normal social pressures of a complex society.
Without accepting the extreme view discussed above, concededly there
are circumstances where the patrol aspects of picketing will be found to
predominate. Sometimes the place of the picketing may be significant in
determining whether the picketing is essentially speech or patrol. Thus,
several courts have recently enjoined the picketing of the homes of nonto annoy the nonstrikers on the theory that such picketing was designed
4
strikers or to intimidate them into staying at home.'
15
In Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowrnoor Dairies, the Supreme Court held that where there had been a continuous pattern of violence (not mere sporadic outbreaks), a state could enjoin all future picketing. The theory of the case, as expounded by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, was
that the "momentum of fear" would continue into the future, thus rendering even seemingly peaceful picketing intimidating.
Recent cases in several jurisdictions indicate that the Meadowmoor
16
In Southern
doctrine may easily be misused in the hands of state courts.

10. In Cole v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 345 (1949), the defendant had engaged in an
outbreak of violence between strikers and non-strikers in which a striker was killed.
The Supreme Court upheld a conviction under a state statute making it unlawful
for any person, acting in concert, to assemble at or near any place where a labor
dispute exists, and by force or violence to prevent any person from engaging in any
lawful vocation.
11. 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942).
12. Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARV. L. REV. 180, 201 (1942).
13. Wherever speech is used to aid popular causes or to urge conformance to
established institutions, the vast social pressures which these causes or institutions
engender become a part of the speech. Thus, when the lights go on in a public hall,
and a speaker makes an impassioned plea for dimes for polio, many react because of
sympathy. Others are shamed into contributing. An advertising placard which
proclaims "Vote for the XYZ Party" enlightens very little. It appeals to habit. Yet,
would we say that either the public address or the placard in the above illustrations
are non-speech?
14. Pipe Machinery Co. v. De More, 149 Ohio St. 582, 79 N.E.2d 910 (1948);
Jacobs v. United Furniture Workers, 16 CCH Lab. Cas. F165,065 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1949).
15. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
16. In Enterprise Window Cleaning Co. v. Slowuta, 299 N.Y. 286. 86 N.E.2d
750 (1949), the New York Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, upheld the trial
court's refusal to modify an injunction against picketing, even though there had been
no violence for eleven years. For a more extensive opinion, see the decision of the
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Bus Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway
Employees 7 an ex parte injunction against all picketing, granted on the
basis of a bill of complaint alleging acts of violence, was sustained on appeal. This case illustrates the danger that mere sporadic acts of violence
may be exaggerated sufficiently by a bill in equity so that a temporary restraining order is obtained without any procedural safeguards. If the
order is obtained at a strategic time, it may succeed in "breaking the back"
of a strike, even though the order is later dissolved. A recent decision of
the Florida Supreme Court suggests the danger that violence, even if employer precipitated,
may serve as a sufficient basis for an injunction against
8
all picketing.'
Union Sanctions.-Suppose picketing, both past and present, has been
peaceful, but union men are obliged to respect it because of union penalties. Is such picketing analogous to free speech?
In Wolferman v. Root,19 members of a butchers' union picketed the
employer's non-union retail meat market. The union established a "recognized picket line," meaning one recognized officially by the Central Trades
Union, the Teamsters Joint Council, and the Building Trades Council.
Thus, there was clearly evidence of some sort of joint action, although
there was no specific evidence of union sanctions. This joint action, plus
the fact that all deliveries to the employer stopped, suggest an inference
that union sanctions played an important role. The court enjoined the
establishment of a picket line which would affect or destroy the delivery of
merchandise to and from the employer's store, but all picketing was not
enjoined. The Wolferman case suggests that where there is a combination
of several industrially unrelated unions, even in the absence of specific evidence of union sanctions, courts will be likely to presume their presence.20
Any given picket line is designed to appeal to a certain group of
people-particular groups of workers, and perhaps consumers. If it could
be ascertained that 50% of those appealed to are obliged to respect the
picket line because of sanctions imposed by the picketing union, or by a
union allied with it as a part of a joint enterprise, 21 then with respect to
this 50% the picketing is predominantly non-speech. But with respect to
the other 50%, which is free to cross the picket line, the picketing is essentially speech. Should such picketing be constitutionally protected? Perhaps under such circumstances the court should enjoin the concerted reAppellate Division in 79 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1st Dep't 1948). Compare the Enterprise
Window case with Henderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 214 Ark. 456, 217 S.W.2d
261 (1949).
In the following cases, however, state courts have refused to enjoin picketing
because of alleged sporadic past violence: Hotel and Restaurant Employees v.
Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265, 30 So. 2d 696 (1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948) ;
Lawrence Ave. Building Corp. v. Van Heck, 377 Ill. 37, 35 N.E.2d 373 (1941); Jones
v. International Association of Machinists, 75 N.E.2d 446 (Ohio C.P. 1947); Carl
Ahlers v. Papa, 65 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 272 App. Div. 905, 71
N.Y.S.2d 423 (1st Dep't 1947) ; Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Everett District
Council, 11 Wash. 2d 503, 119 P.2d 643 (1941).
17. 205 Miss. 354, 38 So. 2d 765 (1949).
18. Moore v. City Dry Cleaners and Laundry, Inc., 41 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1949).
19. 356 Mo. 976, 204 S.W.2d 733 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 837 (1948).
20. Cf. Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N.Y. 1, 124 N.E. 97 (1919).
21. See Report of Trial Examiner in Sealright, Pacific Ltd., 22 LAB. REL. REP.
25 (1948), rejected, 82 N.L.R.B. No. 36, CCH LAB. LAW REP. (NLRB) 118777
(1949). If Union A, acting independently, announces that it will fine or suspend all
members who cross a picket line maintained by Union B, Union B's picketing should
be constitutionally protected. But, of course, this constitutional protection does not
extend to the concerted action of A, which is enjoinable as a separate activity.
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fusal to cross the picket line rather than the picketing itself. This was
the solution arrived at in the Wolferman case,2 2 where the Missouri court
attempted to protect picketing to the extent to which it represented an
appeal to consumers. In the Giboney case, however, where the picketing
was at the site of a wholesale dealer, the whole raison d'etre for the picketing was to influence the unionized drivers who delivered food to and from
Empire's cold storage warehouse. While there was no specific evidence
of a joint enterprise among the various drivers' unions whereby each would
impose penalties on its own members, the opinion of Mr. Justice Black
indicates that the Court did look upon the unions' activities as constituting
such a 23joint effort. So interpreted, the picketing was predominantly non.
speech.
Coercive Effects of Persuasion.-Mr.Justice Douglas emphasized in
his concurring opinion in the Wohl case that persuasion has a normal coercive effect. To the extent that consumers or sympathetic workers are
successfully persuaded not to deal with an employer, the latter is influenced,
in self interest, to modify his conduct. In this sense all picketing is coercive, yet many courts unfortunately equate coercion with illegality. Thus,
in Hanke v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters,24 the Supreme Court
of Washington labeled picketing of a self-employed person coercion, but
gave no indication of why such picketing was any more coercive than other
types of peaceful picketing. It cannot be overly stressed that picketing is
coercive in the above sense, not because of its non-speech aspects, but
simply because it is speech used as a weapon in economic conflict.
SWEEPING STATUTES PROSCRIBING MINORITY PICKETING
In the same year in which the Supreme Court decided the Thornhill
case, the Oregon Supreme Court, in Oregon v. Bain,25 invalidated a statute
which made picketing unlawful in the absence of a "labor dispute" between the picketed employer and the majority of his employees. More
recent cases have followed suit. In International Union v. Cox,26 for example, where a minority of employees at plaintiff's laundry went out on
strike and picketed for better working conditions, the Texas Supreme
Court held the picketing constitutionally protected, thus invalidating a
statute which made minority picketing unlawful. An individual could not
be denied his right to disseminate information merely because he was a
member of a minority, the court declared.2 7 Since in American Federation
of Labor v. Swing, 2 8 the Supreme Court held that picketing could not be
22. Accord, Lubbers v. Hurst, 78 N.E.2d 580 (Ohio C. P. 1946); cf. Retail Clerks
Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 242 Wis. 21, 6 N.W.2d 698 (1942)
(picketing union had power to fine members of all CIO unions who crossed the picket
line as consumers).
23. Another explanation for the varying results in the Giboney and Wolferman
cases is that in the latter case the picketing was, at least in part, organizational
picketing at the primary level-directed at the non-union employees. In the Giboney
case, however, the union was engaged in secondary organizational picketing, the
entire object of which was to induce Empire to violate the state anti-trust statute.
24. 207 P.2d 206 (Wash. 1949), cert. granted, 70 Sup. Ct. 305 (1949).
25. 165 Ore. 183, 106 P.2d 544 (1940).
26. 219 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1949).
27. Accord, International Union v. Utah Employment Relations Board, 203 P.2d
404 (Utah 1949); cf. Hotel and Restaurant Employees v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 236 Wis. 329, 294 N.W. 632 (1940) semble, aff'd, 315 U.S. 437
(1942).
28. 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
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enjoined merely because the pickets were not employees of the picketed
enterprise, it seems to follow, a fortiori, that minority picketing should be
constitutionally protected.
A second type of statute, providing that a majority vote is a condition
precedent to a lawful strike,29 is not, on its face, directed at picketing. Utah
has construed a somewhat similar statute as not directed at peaceful
picketing,3 0 but assuming an opposite construction, two constitutional questions arise. First, is there any constitutional protection extended to the
right to strike? Second, assuming a minority strike can be made unlawful,
is picketing in conjunction with such an "unlawful" minority strike constitutionally protected? Whether the strike is constitutionally protected is
beyond the scope of this Note, 31 but it may be noted that the Supreme
32
Court of Alabama, in Hotel and Restaurant Employees v. Greenwood,
declared, by way of dictum, that the right to strike, at least for so-called
lawful purposes, was within the protection of the Thornhill doctrine. However, in International Union v. McNally,33 the Michigan statute requiring
a majority vote for a lawful strike was upheld by the Michigan Supreme
Court. The issue of picketing in pursuance of an unlawful minority strike
was not before the Michigan court, which distinguished the Bain case as
materially different, but Michigan county courts seem not to have heeded
the distinction, since in two recent cases, lower courts 34
have enjoined picketing in conjunction with an unlawful minority strike.
The persuasive authority of the Swing case and the Bain case would
seem to weigh against the result arrived at by these Michigan courts. The
contention that such picketing is for an unlawful purpose, i.e., to aid an
unlawful minority strike, begs the question. If the purpose of the union's
concerted action is higher wages, for example, then the objective of the
picketing is higher wages. To the extent that picketing is an appeal to
consumers and sympathetic employees of other employers, picketing can
be considered as a distinct and separate activity. Even if such picketing
should be termed picketing for an unlawful purpose, the states are no
longer the final arbiter of what objects are unlawful. Picketing is no longer
prima facie tortious; 5 on the contrary, it is prima facie constitutionally
protected.
PICKETING FOR UNION SECURITY

The post-war years have witnessed a flood of statutes restricting organized labor's drive toward union security. Foremost among these, of
29. MIcH. STAT. ANN., § 17.454(10) (Rice, Supp. 1949).
30. International Union v. Utah Employment Relations Board, 203 P.2d 404

(Utah 1949).
31. See generally, Note, Majority Rule and the Right to Strike, 16 U. OF CHI.

L. Rav. 307 (1949).
32. 249 Ala. 265, 30 So. 2d 696 (1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948);
accord, Stapelton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan. 1945) ; Ala. State Federation
of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 18 So. 2d 810 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, 325
U.S. 450 (1944) ; International Union v. McNally, 15 CCH LAB. CAs. f164,684 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. 1948), rev'd, 325 Mich. 250, 38 N.W.2d 421 (1949).

33. 325 Mich. 250, 38 N.W.2d 421 (1949).

34. Shakespeare Co. v. United Steel Workers,

17 CCH LAB. CAS. ff 65,406

(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1949); American Electrical Heater Co. v. Metal Polishers, Buffers
Union 17 CCH LAB. CAS. 1165,396 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1949).
35• At common law the lawfulness of the strike and of picketing was said to

depend on the lawfulness of the means and purpose. If the means and purpose were
termed lawful, then what was a prima facie tort became privileged. Dorchy v.
Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926); Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 111 (1900).
See also Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1894).
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course, is the Taft-Hartley Act, which outlaws the closed shop, 36 and requires a majority vote of the collective bargaining unit as a condition
precedent for a union shop contract.37 The constitutionality of state
statutes outlawing the closed and union shop was sustained in Lincoln
FederalLabor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co.3" and two companion cases, in one of which Mr. Justice Frankfurter makes an impassioned plea for vigorous self-restraint on the part of the judiciary in nullifying legislation. 39
Now that the constitutionality of these statutes has been established,
does it follow that picketing and/or a strike to secure a union security
agreement are enjoinable? Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in American
Federation of Labor v. American Sash and Door Co.,40 specifically reserved the problem of the strike for a union shop. It is submitted, however,
that unless the employer has some remedy to prevent economic pressure
in the form of a strike or picketing, he will be placed in a helpless dilemma,
like the employer in the Giboney case. The rationale of the Giboney case
would indicate that picketing for a union security objective is enjoinable
where there is a statute making such contracts unlawful, which prevents
employer compliance. 41 It follows, a fortiori, that picketing by a minority
or by non-employees where the pickets demand a union security contract
is enjoinable if there is a state statute rendering employer discrimination
against nonunion men unlawful unless the union represents a minority of
the employees.
State Legislation.-Courtshave enjoined such picketing under several
types of statutes.
Where a union engaged in organizational picketing demanded a union shop,
Texas invoked its Anti-Closed Shop statute to
42
enjoin the picketing.
Pennsylvania has treated a similar situation as illegal coercion. In
Wilbank v. Chester and Delaware County Bartenders Union,43 members of
a bartenders union picketed a cafe. The employer, apparently neutral, was
willing to sign the demanded union shop contract if the majority of his
employees joined the union, but his employees refused. Under the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, an employer cannot discriminate against nonunion men unless he has signed a union shop contract with a majority
36. Section 8(a) (3).
37. Ibid.
38. 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
39. American Federation of Labor v. American Sash and Door Co., 335 U.S.
538 (1949). The wisdom of such statutes is at least arguable. Some of the principal arguments advanced in support of union demands for a closed shop are: (1) A
union of all members in a particular trade or occupation is necessary to give the union
sufficient bargaining strength; (2) A union must have disciplinary powers over all
men in the unit if it is to discharge its contractual responsibilities; and (3) The
"free-ride" argument: since all employees in the unit benefit from the union, all
should support it, on the analogy to taxes.
40. 335 U.S. 538, 557 (1949).
41. But cf. Mascari v. International Brotherhood, 187 Tenn. 345, 215 S.W.2d
779 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 907 (1949) (strike for closed shop enjoined on
the basis of the Tennessee Anti-Closed Shop Statute, but picketing permitted by
virtue of the Thornhill doctrine).
42. Construction and General Labor Union v. Stephenson, 17 CCH LAB. CAS.
1165,530 (Tex. 1950).
43. 360 Pa. 48, 60 A.2d 21 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 945 (1949), followed il
Phillips v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 362 Pa. 78, 66 A.2d 227
(1949) ; accord, Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Milk and Ice Cream
Drivers, 238 Wis. 379, 299 N.W. 31 (1941); Retail Clerks' Union v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 242 Wis. 21, 6 N.W.2d 698 (1942) (alternative
holding).
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union. 44 Picketing was enjoined under the Pennsylvania Anti-Injunction
Statute which allows an injunction to be granted where a union is seeking
to "coerce" an45
employer into violating the Pennsylvania or National Labor

Relations Act.

46
Gazzarn v. Building Service Employees Union, now before the Su-

preme Court, involved essentially the same fact situation as the Wilbank
case. The Washington Supreme Court held the picketing union liable in
damages on the basis of a general declaration of legislative policy to the
effect that workers should be free to associate or not to associate, without
coercion from employers. 47 The Nevada Supreme Court, however, has
refused to stretch legislation enacted to curb "yellow-dog" contracts into
an Anti-Closed Shop statute. 48 The Giboney case may indicate that states
have relatively free reign in construing broad statutes so as to render an
act of an employer a statutory violation. Picketing is then enjoinable on
the Giboney rationale.
Taft-Hartley Act.-Picketing for a union shop has also been enjoined
by state courts on the basis of the Taft-Hartley Act. In Standard Grocer
Co. v. Local 406,4 9 where organizational pickets demanded a union shop,
the court enjoined picketing, holding that one of its purposes was to make
the employer commit an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a) (1) of
the Act,50 i.e., to make the employer coerce his employees into joining a
union. Apart from constitutional considerations, the use of the TaftHartley Act by state courts as a device to enjoin picketing seems unwarranted. Forcing an employer to commit an unfair practice is not in itself
an unfair practice. Section 8(b) (2) 51 might, on its face, be considered
violated by picketing for a union shop, but the National Labor Relations
Board has recently indicated, by way of dictum,5 2 that the effect of Section
8(c) r3 is to remove peaceful picketing from the former's scope. Similarly, organizational picketing might be considered a violation of Section
8(b) (4) (A) " where the effect is to cause truckers or other workers
44. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, §211.6(c) (Purdon, 1941).
45. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, §206(d) (Purdon, 1941).
46. 29 Wash. 2d 488, 188 P.2d 97 (1947); 207 P.2d 699 (Wash. 1949) (same
case after new trial), cert. granted, 70 Sup. Ct. 308 (1949).
47. Accord, Consumers Sand and Gravel Co. v. Kalamazoo Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 321 Mich. 361, 32 N.W.2d 531 (1948).
48. State ex rel. Culinary Workers Union v. Eighth Judicial District, 207 P.2d
990 (Nev. 1949), 210 P.2d 454 (Nev. 1949) (rehearing).
49. 321 Mich. 276, 32 N.W.2d 519 (1948).
50. "§ 8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 . . ."

Among the rights guaranteed by § 7 is the right to refrain from

engaging in concerted activities.
51. "§ 8(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents . . . (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a)

(3)

. . ."

Section 8(a) (3)

makes it an

unfair practice for an employer to encourage or discourage membership in a union
by discrimination in hire or tenure of employment, unless at least a majority of the
employees in the appropriate collective bargaining unit vote for a contract whereby
union membership is a prerequisite for employment.
52. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 81 N.L.R.B. No. 127, CCH
8657, at p. 9187 (1949J.
LAB. LAw RFP. (NLRB)
53. "§ 8(c) The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute
or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if
such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
54. See note 97 infra.
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not to handle or use goods of the picketed employer, but the NLRB 5
and the courts 56 have indicated that the Congressional intent behind the
section was merely to outlaw secondary boycotts, and primary organizational picketing has not usually been considered a manifestation of a secondary boycott.5 7 Perhaps the strongest reason against the use of the
Act by state courts to enjoin peaceful picketing is that the intent of Congress is unmistakably clear that only the NLRB should be able to petition
for injunctive relief. 58 It is a gross distortion of the Act to consider- the
unfair labor practices section independently from the sections providing
for remedies.

Massachusetts Doctrine.-Where an employer is perfectly free under
state law to enter into a union shop contract with a majority union, can
the courts enjoin picketing to induce the employer to consent to such an
agreement? The Massachusetts courts have answered the question in the
9
the union, demanding an extenaffirmative. In Colonial Press v. Ellisr,
sion of a former contract embodying a maintenance of membership clause,
struck at the employer's refusal and picketed. The court enjoined the
picketing, labeling it picketing directed toward an unlawful purpose, i.e.,
union security.60
It is difficult to reconcile the Massachusetts rule with the Thornhill
doctrine, even as construed in the Giboney case. If there is any vigor
remaining in the Thornhill doctrine, then certainly the picketing in the
Colonial case should have been constitutionally protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Massachusetts rule is a survival of the common
law unlawful purpose test. In the Giboney case, the picketing was designed to induce the employer to commit an act, rendered unlawful by
statute. In the Colonial case, not only was there no relevant statute, but
the employer was as free to agree to a maintenance of membership clause
as he was to raise wages.
ORGANIZATIONAL PICKETING
Organizational picketing is more commonly called "stranger picketing," an unfortunate term because it equates "nonemployee" with
"stranger." In cases of organizational picketing, both the pickets and the
picketed employees are members of the same occupation or industry, and
although the purposes of organizational picketing may be varied, they usually
include unionization of the employees (or the self-employed worker).
55. Pure Oil Co., 84 N.L.R.B. No. 38, CCH LAE. LAw RzP. (NLRB) 19000
(1949).
56. See Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672, 676
(S.D.N.Y. 1948); cf. Printing Specialties and Paper Converters Union v. LeBaron,
171 F.2d 331, 334 (9th Cir. 1948).
57. See Bernard and Graham, Labor and the Secondary Boycott, 15 WAsH. L.
REv. 137, 141 (1940). The authors point out that, very strictly, every picket line
constitutes a secondary boycott, since the pickets are asking outsiders to aid them
in a boycott of the picketed enterprise. However, in common usage the term
"secondary boycott" refers to those situations where economic pressure (whether it
be by strike, picketing, or "unfair" list) is directed against one who sells to, or buys
from, or has economic relations of any sort with an employer engaged in a dispute
with his employees or with a union.
58. Amalgamated Association of Street Railway Employees v. Dixie Motor
Coach Corp., 170 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1948); State ex rel. Culinary Workers v.
Eighth Judicial District, 207 P.2d 990 (Nev. 1949).
59. 321 Mass. 495, 74 N.E.2d 1 (1947).
60. Fashioncraft v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385, 48 N.E.2d 1 (1943); accord, Davis
Brothers Fisheries v. Pimentel, 322 Mass. 499, 78 N.E.2d 93 (1948).
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Two basic drives normally engender organizational picketing. Economic competition exists between union and nonunion men, directly, or
indirectly via competition between union and nonunion shops. Thus, carpenters in Philadelphia compete with each other directly, while textile workers in Massachusetts compete with similar workers in the South indirectly 61
as a result of the competition between their products on the market. Secondly, where unionization of numerous shops in an industry has succeeded
in raising labor standards in the nonunion shops to that of the union shops,
organized labor feels strongly that workers in the nonunion shops should
02
support the union which is responsible for their improved conditions.
Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, although it involved secondary
picketing directed at self-employed workers, is an excellent illustration of
the drives underlying many cases of organizational picketing. New York
bakeries had started distributing baked goods via independent vendors,
rather than employee-drivers. The peddlers were thus in competition with
unionized employee-drivers, and were tending to drive down union wage
and hour standards. Demanding that the peddlers join the union, or failing that, that they at least adhere to the union 6-day work week, and
employ a union man for the seventh day at the union wage scale, the
union picketed bakeries which sold to the vendors, and threatened to
picket retailers who purchased from them. The Supreme Court held such
picketing constitutionally protected, referring to the Swing case.
The primary purpose of organizational picketing normally is to unionize the nonunion employees. If the picketing in a given instance is directed
solely at the nonunion employees, and if there is no demand on the employer, then it would seem that the picketing is constitutionally protected.
Similarly, if the union's essential interest is to raise wages in the nonunion shops to the union level, and if the union demands only that from
the employer, it is unlikely that state courts could constitutionally enjoin
picketing. Both the Swing and Wohl cases support this conclusion.
Where the union demands, however, that the employer violate a statute by granting a union security contract, it has already been pointed out
that many courts have enjoined all picketing.63 If picketing for a closed
shop (where the employer must violate a statute) is unlawful, is the union
free to picket solely for the purpose of unionizing the employees? Many
courts have neglected the point. One has rejected it, relying on the common law dogma that picketing for both a lawful and an unlawful objective
is unlawful.0 4 In Park and Tilford v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters,05 on the other hand, the California Supreme Court held that picketing
as a part of a demand that the employer coerce his employees into joining
the union was unlawful; but picketing for the purpose of persuading the
employees to join was permitted. Constitutional law was an alternative
ground for the decision. The court stressed the fact that a union engaged
61. See Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Duplex Printing Press Co.
v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 479 (1921).
62. For excellent discussions of organizational picketing, see Standard Grocer
Co. v. Local 406, 321 Mich. 276, 32 N.W.2d 519 (1948) (concurring opinion of
Bushnell, C.J.) ; McKay v. Retail Auto Salesmen's Union, 16 Cal. 2d 311, 106 P.2d
373 (1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 566 (1941); Smith Metropolitan Mkt. Co. v.
Lyons, 16 Cal. 2d 389, 106 P.2d 414 (1940).
63. E.g., Wilbank v. Chester & Delaware Cos. Bartenders Union, 360 Pa. 48,
60 A.2d 21 (1948) ; Construction and General Labor Union v. Stephenson, 17 CCH
LAB. CAs. g 65,530 (Tex. 1950). See text at notes 42 if. supra.
64. Standard Grocer Co. v. Local 406, 321 Mich. 276, 293, 32 N.W.2d 519, 527
(1948) (opinion of Boyles, J.).
65. 27 Cal. 2d 599, 165 P.2d 891 (1946).
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in organizational picketing normally has a legitimate dispute with the nonunion employees-whether based on the competition between union and nonunion shops, or on the "free-ride" argument. While an employer may be
in fact neutral, if the court grants an injunction at his request, he is no
longer passive, but has become an ally of his nonunion employees. More
recently Nevada has arrived at the same result in State ex rel. Culinary
Workers Union v. Eighth Judicial District.6
Courts which have not adopted the California view have been much
influenced by the employer's helplessness as an unfortunate neutral. In the
Wilbank case, it will be remembered, the court emphasized the employer's
willingness to abide by his employees' decision. But neutrality is a flexible concept. It may mean merely that there is no evidence of employer
discrimination against union men. A stricter standard of neutrality would
Finally, a
require that the employer make no anti-union statements.0
third standard might include a concept of economic neutrality, i.e., that the
employer realize no economic benefit from the employment of nonunion
labor.68 Courts which have relied on the employer's neutrality as a justification for enjoining organizational picketing where there is a demand
for a closed shop, unfortunately have made no thorough analysis of the
concept of employer neutrality.
Where there is evidence of employer discrimination, courts are less
likely to enjoin picketing, even if there is a closed shop demand.6 9 In
Caldwell v. Anderson,7" the employer was a builder who employed only
nonunion employees, although 95% of the labor engaged in the construction industry in the county were union workers. Thus, the inference is
strong that the employer discriminated in hiring. Picketing to induce the
employer to employ only union men was permitted on the authority of the
Swing case, by the same court that decided the Giboney case.
There is much merit in the California view. Since picketing in general is a constitutionally protected activity, the old dogma that picketing
for both an unlawful purpose and a lawful purpose is unlawful must be reevaluated. To the extent that organizational picketing is reasonably related to the interests of the picketing union, and is not designed to force
the employer to violate a statute, it should be constitutionally protected.
66. 207 P.2d 990, 996 (Nev. 1949). Peters v. Central Labor Council, 179 Ore.
1, 169 P.2d 870 (1946), is very similar to the Park and Tilford case. The Oregon
court held organizational picketing protected by the Oregon Anti-Injunction Statute
in spite of demand for a closed shop. Where organizational pickets demanded a
closed shop, picketing has been held constitutionally protected to the extent that
response was not the result of union sanctions or of such inter-union cooperation as
would lead a court to infer sanctions. Wolferman v. Root, 356 Mo. 976, 204 S.W.2d
733 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 837 (1948) ; Lubbers v. Hurst, 78 N.E.2d 580
(Ohio C. P. 1946).
In the following cases, organizational picketing was held protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of these cases, it is uncertain whether there was a
specific union demand for a union security contract. McKay v. Retail Auto Salesmen's Union, 16 Cal. 2d 311, 106 P.2d 373 (1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 566 (1941);
Whitehead v. Miami Laundry, 160 Fla. 667, 36 So. 2d 382 (1948) ; Lawrence Building Corp. v. Van Heck, 377 Ill. 37, 35 N.E.2d 373 (1941) ; Heine's Inc. v. Truck
Drivers and Helpers Local, 129 N.J.Eq. 308, 19 A.2d 204 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941);
Blonder v. Retail Employees, 129 N.J.Eq. 424, 19 A.2d 786 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941).
67. But cf. Standard Grocer Co. v. Local 406, 321 Mich. 276, 293, 32 N.W.2d
519, 527 (1948).
68. Ibid.
69. McKay v. Retail Auto Salesmen's Union, 16 Cal. 2d 311, 106 P.2d 373 (1940).
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 566 (1941) ; Jones v. International Association of Machinists,
75 N.E.2d 446 (Ohio C. P. 1947).
70. 357 Mo. 1199, 212 S.W.2d 784 (1948).
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The Supreme Court, of course, is the final arbiter of what is reasonably
related to the interests of the picketing union.
False Placards.-False placards have generally been enjoined as
libelous, 7' even though the view has been expressed that such an injunction
constitutes an unconstitutional "previous restraint." 72 In Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos,73 the Supreme Court declared that continuing
representations unquestionably false were not constitutional prerogatives.
But the term "unfair" was labelled as "loose language," "a part of the
conventional give-and-take in our economic and political controversies."
Where organizational pickets demand that the employer violate a statute by granting a closed shop, placards alleging that the employer refuses
to grant a closed shop should be enjoinable. While technically true, such
statements grossly misrepresent the employer's position. Similarly, placards
alleging "a strike" should be enjoinable. On the other hand, statements
that there is a nonunion shop should certainly be permitted. The implication of the Angelos case is that placards alleging the employer is "unfair"
are constitutionally protected. However, it must be noted that the specific
issue in the Angelos case was whether all picketing could be enjoined, not
whether the placards could be limited to certain language. New York
courts have tended to confine the language used by pickets very strictly. 74
In a recent case, for example, the use of the term "unfair" was enjoined.Y
Organizational Picketing Directed at the Self-Employed Worker.Where the self-employed workers perform the same function in competition with employee union members, the union has a legitimate economic
interest in unionizing them. The only Supreme Court case involving
of a self-employed worker is Cafeteria Employees
picketing at the premises
Union v. Angelos,7 6 in which the picketing was held constitutionally protected. In Hanke v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,77 members
of a salesmen's union (affiliated with the Teamsters) picketed the plaintiff's auto agency. The plaintiff employed no salesmen. The union had
secured from other agencies (only a minority of which employed salesmen) an agreement whereby showrooms were open only during certain
hours, and picketed the plaintiff in order to induce him to conform to
this policy. The court enjoined picketing,78 holding that the union's interest was small and indirect when balanced against the right of independent
businessmen to decide their own policy. Since the plaintiff, working longer
hours, was threatening the union's standards, by competing with unionized
agencies which observed the union work week, the only ways in which the
union could protect itself were to insist on the observance of the union
work week, or to demand that the plaintiff hire salesmen during the extra
hours.
71. Magill Brothers, Inc. v. Building Service Employees, 20 Cal. 2d 506, 127
P.2d 542 (1942).
72. Id. at 512, 127 P.2d at 545 (dissenting opinion).
73. 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
74. Dinny and Robbins Inc. v. Davis, 290 N.Y. 101, 48 N.E.2d 280 (1943), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 774 (1943).
75. Hardy's Hillside, Inc. v. Clement, 16 CCH LAD. CAS. 165,281 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1949).
76. 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
77. 207 P.2d 206 (Wash. 1949), cert. granted, 70 Sup. Ct. 305 (1949).
78. Accord, Cline v. Auto Drivers and Demonstrators Union, 207 P.2d 216
(Wash. 1949), cert. granted, 70 Sup. Ct. 305 (1949) ; see Wright v. Teamsters Union,
207 P.2d 662, 664 (Wash. 1949) ; ef. Dinoffria v. Teamsters Union, 331 Ill. App. 129,
72 N.E.2d 635 (1947), aff'd, 399 Ill. 304, 77 N.E.2d 661 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
815 (1948).
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79
In Coons v. Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressers Union, picketing to
induce a self-employed barber to join a union was held constitutionally protected.80 Nevertheless, a demand that a self-employed worker join a union
is often a means to some other end, which may be undesirable. Used as a
means to force self-employed workers to relinquish their independent status
and to become employees, 8 ' or to assume an inactive status,82 such picketing
is not constitutionally protected, according to the California decisions. If
states which have statutes outlawing union security contracts can enjoin
picketing for such a purpose, it might be argued by analogy that picketing
a self-employed worker to induce him to join a union is also enjoinable.
Is it the purpose of such a statute to immunize the worker from all social
pressures, or merely to prevent employer discrimination against nonunion
workers? Platitudes about the so-called right to work only obscure this
issue. If the purpose of such statutes is limited to the prevention of employer discrimination, then picketing to unionize the self-employed worker
should be constitutionally protected; indeed, an attempt to immunize the
worker from the social pressure of picketing may be an unconstitutional
restriction of free speech on the authority of the Swing and Wohl cases.
Picketing of the self-employed worker must proceed for purposes reasonably
8
related to working conditions, if injustice is to be avoided. 3 The constitutional protection should extend no further.

SECONDARY PICKETING
Secondary picketing is a term used to denote picketing at the prem84
ises of an employer who is one step removed from the primary dispute.
It is used here regardless of how close the nexus is between the labor
dispute and the picketed enterprise.
In the Meadowrnoor s5 case, the dictum of the Supreme Court was
that picketing of a retailer who purchased milk from independent vendors
was constitutionally protected. In the Wohl case, picketing of bakeries
which sold baked goods to independent vendors was held constitutionally
8
did the
protected. Only in Carpenters and Joiners v. Ritter's Cafe
Court hold that a state could proscribe picketing of an employer because
he was too remotely connected with the primary dispute. Ritter, a restaurant owner, had engaged a nonunion contractor to construct a building for him on a site a mile and a half from the restaurant. The Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that Texas could invoke its Anti-Trust statute to enjoin picketing of the restaurant by members of the Carpenters'
Union, since there was not a sufficient industrial connection between the
restaurant and the building industry.
79. 222 Minn. 100, 23 N.W.2d 345 (1946).
80. Accord, Naprawa v. Chicago Flat Janitors' Union, 315 Ill. App. 328, 43 N.E.2d
198 (1942) ; LoBianco v. Holt, 70 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. 1947). But cf. Miller v.
Tobin, 70 N.Y.S.2d 36 (N.Y. City Ct. 1947). Picketing to induce a self-employed
worker to join a union is lawful in California as a matter of state law. See Bautista
v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 749, 155 P.2d 343, 345 (1944).
81. Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 155 P.2d 343 (1944).
82. Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers Union, 88 Cal. App. 2d 499, 199 P.2d 400
(1st Dist. 1948).
83. Ibid.
84. See generally, Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes, 47 YALE
L. J. 341 (1938) ; Bernard and Graham, Labor and the Secondary Boycott, 15 WAsH.
L. REv. 137 (1940).
85. 312 U.S. 287 (1941) ; see note 3 supra.
86. 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
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The Giboney case and the Ritter case illustrate two widely varying
approaches to the problem of secondary picketing. In the Ritter case, although the Texas Anti-Trust statute was mentioned, the entire emphasis
of the Court is on the lack of industrial connection between the building
industry and the picketed premises. While the Court may have drawn
the circle of economic intimacy too close, the approach used is essentially
sound.8 7 In the Giboney case, however, the economic relation between the
vendors and Empire was not even explored. If the vendors were employees of Empire, then organizational picketing at Empire's premises
would be constitutionally protected. Such picketing ought not to be rendered
illegal merely by the device of dealing with the vendors as if they were truly
independent contractors. The actual economic relationship between Empire and the vendors was similar to the typical principal-agent relationship.
In such a situation, the New York Court of Appeals has held that a
"union" composed entirely of independent laundry drivers is an organization of "workers" within the exception to the state Anti-Trust statute.88
In a recent Sherman Act prosecution,8 9 the Supreme Court declared that
while an agency device might determine the rights of the parties inter se,
it would not necessarily control if the rights of third parties intervened.
Certainly consideration should be given, likewise, to piercing the independent contractor relationship in cases like the Giboney, where rights
of a third party-the union-have intervened. The decision leaves the
union with no practical weapon to protect itself, since vendors on wheels
are virtually immune from the pressure of primary picketing.
While the Giboney case may have dealt a fatal blow to all secondary
picketing, it is probably premature to make such a pronouncement. If it
decides to do so, the Court will have not the slightest difficulty in limiting
the case to its own peculiar fact situation. The significance of the union
sanctions has already been noted. 0 Further, it is significant that the great
bulk of Empire's business was derived from its public cold storage warehouse, incidentally an essential industry.91 Thus, the Court saw a combination of several unions, using union sanctions as a whip, effectively
cutting off almost all deliveries from Empire's cold storage warehouse (its
major business) in order to force it to stop selling ice (a minor part of
its business) to the peddlers. Further, unlike the employer in the Wohl
and Meadowntoor cases, Empire had not just recently instituted a distribution system of independent vendors in place of employee drivers.9 2
State courts have generally not included secondary picketing within
constitutional protection, and have enjoined it, either on the basis of
Anti-Trust statutes,9 3 or statutes 94 similar to the one invalidated in Ore87. Compare Gomez v. United Office and Professional Workers, 73 F. Supp. 679
(D.C. 1947), where the court uses a test of geographical remoteness.
88. People v. Gassman, 295 N.Y. 254, 66 N.E.2d 705 (1946).
89. United States v. Masonite Corporation, 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
90. 336 U.S. 490, 493, 503 (1949). See text at note 23 supra.
91. Empire Storage and Ice Co. v. Giboney, 357 Mo. 671, 673, 210 S.W.2d 55

(1948).
92. Id. at 673, 210 S.W.2d at 56.
93. Northeast Texas Motor Lines v. Dickson, 210 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948), aff'd on other grounds, 219 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1949); Borden Co. v. Local
133, 152 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Harper v. Brennan, 311 Mich. 489, 18
N.W.2d 905 (1945) (concurring opinion of Sharpe, J.). Contra: Ellingsen v. Milk
Wagon Drivers Union, 377 Ill. 76, 35 N.E.2d 349 (1941).
94. Idaho v. Casselman, 205 P.2d 1131 (Idaho 1949), cert. denied, 70 Sup. Ct.
248 (1949); Denver Milk Producers v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 116
Colo. 389, 183 P.2d 529 (1947), appeal dismissed w/o prejudice, 334 U.S. 809 (1948).

558

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

gon v. Bain.95 In New York and California, secondary picketing is protected as a matter of state law if there is a sufficient unity of interest
between the picketed enterprise and the "primary" employer. 96
In the Giboney case, it was a supplier who was picketed. However,
where the unionization of workers engaged in manufacturing, processing,
or mining is unsuccessful, unions normally follow the nonunion goods toward the market, applying secondary pressure against intermediate distributors, retailers, and consumers. Several such cases have arisen under

Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 97 To the extent that
secondary picketing is an appeal to consumers, it is not affected by the Act.

However, picketing that encourages or induces a refusal by workers to
handle goods, where its purpose is to force A to cease doing business
with B, has been held an unfair labor practice by the Courts of Appeals for
the 9th 9 8 and 10th " Circuits and by the National Labor Relations
Board. 100 The leading case decided by the Board is United Brotherhood
of Carpentersand Joiners.10 1 The union picketed Klassen, a union builder,
in order to induce him to stop purchasing prefabricated houses from Wadsworth, who employed nonunion labor at wage rates inferior to the union
scale. In a 3-2 decision, the Board ordered the union to cease picketing
Klassen and to cease placing him on a blacklist. The Board, of course, assumed the constitutionality of Section 8(b) (4) (A).
As a matter of
statutory construction, the Board found that Section 8(b) (4) (A), read
alone, made picketing in the case an unfair practice, and that Section 8
(c),102 which protects picketing, did not qualify Section 8(b) (4) (A).
The fact situation in the case offers a fine opportunity for an attack
on the blanket provisions of Section 8(b) (4) (A). As the union contended, its action was essentially a product boycott. Klassen was hardly
a neutral in any genuine sense,. 0 3 since he was reaping commercial advan95. 165 Ore. 183, 106 P.2d 544 (1940). See text at note 25 supra.
96. Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 155 P.2d 343 (1944); Enterprise Window
Cleaning Co. v. Slowuta, 299 N.Y. 286, 86 N.E.2d 750 (1949) ; People v. Muller, 286
N.Y. 281, 36 N.E.2d 206 (1941); Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d
910 (1937); Feldman v. Weiner, 173 Misc. 461, 17 N.Y.S.2d 730 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
97. "§8(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents .
"(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer
to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment
to use, manufacture

. .

or otherwise handle or work on any goods . . . where

an object thereof is:
"(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to
join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person
to cease using, selling . . .or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer . . . or to cease doing business with any other person."

98. Printing Specialties and Paper Converters Union v. Le Baron, 171 F.2d 331
(9th Cir. 1948).
99. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. Sperry, 170 F.2d 863 (10th
Cir. 1948).
100. Sealright Pacific, Ltd., 82 N.L.R.B. No. 36, CCH LAB. LAw REP. (NLRB)
1 8777 (1949) ; United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 81 N.L.R.B. No. 127,
CCH LAB. LAw REP. (NLRB) 8657 (1949).
101. 81 N.L.R.B. No. 127, CCH LAB. LAw REP. (NLRB) 1 8657 (1949).
102. See note 53 supra.
103. Is neutrality a factor under § 8(b) (4) (A)? In Douds v. Metropolitan
Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), employer A, paralyzed
by a strike, subcontracted most of his work to employer B. The NLRB Regional
Director sought an injunction against the picketing of B's premises by the strikers.
In refusing an injunction, the court held that § 8(b) (4) (A) was designed only to
prevent secondary boycotts, that picketing is not secondary where employer A uses
the employees of B as "scabs," and that a contrary interpretation might render the
section unconstitutional. See also Trial Examiner Whittemore's Report in 22 LAB.
REL. REP. 109 (1949).
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tage from the use of Wadsworth's low wage, nonunion goods. If, on the
other hand, Wadsworth's employees, while nonunion, were employed under
conditions equal to union standards, or if a recognized union at Wadsworth's plant were striking for increased economic benefits, a forceful
argument could be made against protecting secondary picketing. By the
economic intimacy test used in the Ritter case, this secondary picketing is
certainly constitutionally protected. However, if the Giboney case is faithfully adhered to, it is unlikely that there can be any constitutional attack
on Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
PICKETING TO OUST A RECOGNIZED BARGAINING AGENT

Picketing to oust a recognized bargaining agent may be differentiated
into cases where Union A is certified as the exclusive bargaining agent by
the National Labor Relations Board or by a State Board, and those where
there has been no certification, although Union A has been recognized by
the employer as a majority union. In both situations, Union B pickets
for recognition. State courts faced with the former fact situation have
generally enjoined picketing on the theory that it was designed to force
the employer to violate a statute. 10 4 However, the argument has been
made here, as in cases of organizational picketing, that the picketing is
directed not at the employer, but at the employees. 0 5 Several recent New
York cases have given this proposition limited acceptance by permitting
picketing by Union B, with the proviso that the placards must not declare
that there is a strike or that the employer is unfair. 00 These cases have
rested essentially on the Thornhill doctrine rather than on the state AntiInjunction statute.
Even if the contention is accepted that Union B's picketing is directed
at the employees, may not a state reasonably decide that stability in labor
relations demands that Union A, once certified, be allowed to serve as an
exclusive bargaining agent for a reasonable period of time? If so, it
would seem that a state could constitutionally enjoin picketing designed
to "force" employees to change their union affiliation, at least during most
of the period covered by a collective bargaining agreement. However, if a
"contract" is about to expire and another election may be held, peaceful
picketing as a method of campaigning should be constitutionally protected.
Formerly, the federal courts generally held peaceful picketing, even
to oust a certified bargaining agent, protected by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. 107 Section 8(b) (4) (C) 108 of the Taft-Hartley Act apparently
104. White v. Murphy, 310 Mass. 510, 38 N.E.2d 685 (1942) ; Florsheim Shoe
Store v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union, 288 N.Y. 188, 42 N.E.2d 480 (1942); Markham and Callow v. International Woodworkers, 170 Ore. 517, 135 P.2d 727 (1943)
Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills v. International Woodworkers, 4 Wash. 2d 62, 102
P.2d 270 (1940); cf. Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 27 Wash. 2d 193,
177 P.2d 873 (1947).
105. Montgomery Ward Employees Ass'n v. Retail Clerks Ass'n, 38 F. Supp.
321 (N.D. Cal. 1941) (decided under the Norris-LaGuardia Act).
106. Sachs Quality Furniture v. Hensley, 269 App. Div. 264, 55 N.Y.S.2d 450

(1st Dep't 1945).

107. American Chain and Cable Co. v. Truck Drivers Union, 68 F. Supp. 54

(D.N.J. 1946) ; Yoerg Brewing Co. v. Brennan, 59 F. Supp. 625 (D. Minn. 1945);
Montgomery Ward Employees Ass'n v. Retail Clerks Ass'n, 38 F. Supp. 321
(N.D. Cal. 1941). But cf. United Premier Food Stores v. Retail Food Clerks, 98 F.2d

821 (3rd Cir. 1938) ; Oberman v. United Garment Workers, 21 F. Supp. 20 (W.D.

Mo. 1937).

108. "§ 8(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization of its
agents . . .

"(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer
to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to
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changes this. In Oppenheim Collins Dept. Store Employees Union,10 9
Union B called a strike, picketed, and distributed leaflets in order to force
the employer to recognize B and thus oust A, the certified union. The
Board held that B's action constituted an unfair labor practice under Section 8(b) (4) (C).
Where Union A has not been certified, but has been recognized as a
majority union by the employer, there is strong state authority, usually
based on state statutes, that picketing by union B for recognition is protected." 0 Several forceful arguments can be offered to support such a
rule. Obviously, there is an ever present danger that Union A may be
company dominated. Further, the determination of whether Union A has
a majority is often a function of the unit chosen."' The national or state
board, not the employer, must make that choice. On the other hand, the
rule may discourage employers from signing collective bargaining agreements in the absence of certification, even if the union submits convincing
proof of its majority status.
PICKETING IN NON-LABOR DISPUTES

The constitutional protection afforded picketing in non-labor disputes
has never been before the Supreme Court. Yet, since picketing is a constitutionally protected form of speech, there seems no reason why its protection should be confined to labor disputes. Wherever in our economy
bargaining takes place between two groups, one of which occupies an inherently inferior bargaining position, picketing may play a useful role.
Thus, several New York courts have held that picketing by consumers at
high prices or the type of food
the premises of retailers in protest against
2
sold is constitutionally protected."
In many cases, however, anti-trust laws prove a difficult barrier to
surmount. If, in the Giboney case, all the distributors of ice in the area
had been converted into independent vendors, could they have picketed
Empire as part of a combined effort to extract lower wholesale prices?
Most of the arguments presented for the protection of picketing in the
Giboney case are valid here. Yet it follows a fortiori that picketing in
the hypothetical situation is enjoinable." 3 Again, suppose a "union" or
cooperative of small farmers or fishermen engage in a converted refusal
use, manufacture . . . or otherwise handle or work on any goods . . . where an
object thereof is:
". . . (C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain
with a particular labor organization as the representative of his employees
if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such
employees under the provisions of section 9 . . ."
109. 83 N.L.R.B. No. 47, CCH LAB. LAw REP. (NLRB) 18897 (1949).
110. Stone Logging Co. v. International Woodworkers, 171 Ore. 13, 135 P.2d
759 (1943) ; Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Everett District Council, 11 Wash. 2d 503,
119 P.2d 643 (1941) ; cf. Lumber and Sawmill Workers v. Superior Court, 24 Wash.
314, 164 P.2d 662 (1945). But cf. Dinny and Robbins v. Davis, 290 N.Y. 101, 48
N.E.2d 280 (1943), cert. deniqd, 319 U.S. 774 (1943). Contra: International Association of Machinists v. Downtown Employees' Association, 204 S.W.2d 685 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947).
111. Stone Logging Co. v. International Woodworkers, 171 Ore. 13, 135 P.2d
759 (1943).
112. Rosman v. United Kosher Butchers, 164 Misc. 378, 298 N.Y.S. 343 (Sup.
Ct. 1937) ; Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 274 N.Y.S. 250 (1934).
113. But cf. People v. Gassman, 295 N.Y. 254, 66 N.E.2d 705 (1946); see text
at note 88 supra.
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to sell to a canner, and picket the cannery." 4 Forceful arguments can be
made to protect such picketing, but the authority of the Giboney case indicates that such picketing may be enjoined.
Picketing used as a protest against racial discrimination in employment, has been held constitutionally protected in New York," 5 but California has recently enjoined such picketing on the strained theory that it
is analogous to picketing for a closed shop and a closed union." 6
Several recent cases have arisen involving the use of picketing by
unions to aid in a scheme to fix or control prices. In Saveall v. Demers,117
Massachusetts enjoined the picketing of a self-employed barber where the
object was to induce him to maintain a union price scale. In Mayer
Brothers Poultry Farms v. Meltzer," 8 a union of poultry slaughterers
attempted to attain an area monopoly by picketing New York City retailers who sold poultry slaughtered outside New York City. 1 9 The court
held that the picketing should have been enjoined. It is likely that the
states can invoke their anti-trust laws to proscribe picketing where it is
part of a combination to eliminate price competition, 20 but picketing to
eliminate competition based on labor is constitutionally protected. If
almost the entire cost of a given commodity or service is represented by
the labor cost of the picketing union, as may have been the fact in the
Saveall case, the maintenance of a union price scale may be the only way
the union can~maintain its wage scale.
CONCLUSION

The task before the Supreme Court has been to steer a course between
two of the most significant dictums of the late Justice Brandeis. In Senn
v. Tile Layers Protective Union,'21 he planted the seed from which sprang
three years later the Thornhill doctrine, when he declared that members
of a union might publicize the facts of a labor dispute without special
statutory authorization. Yet, earlier, in his dissent in Duplex Printing
Press v. Deering,122 he expressed the view that the legislature might set
the limits of permissible contest. Thus, picketing was to be protected as
free speech; yet, to the extent that picketing was used as a weapon in
industrial warfare, the legislature might set limits upon it.
114. This was essentially the fact situation in Hawaiian Tuna Packers v. International Longshoremen's Union, 72 F. Supp. 562 (D. Hawaii 1947), where the court
enjoined the picketing, neglecting the constitutional issue. Cooperative marketing
agencies of fishermen or farmers, if organized according to statute, are exempt from
the Sherman Act. But they cannot combine with other groups, nor can they eliminate
competition between members and non-members. United States v. Borden Co., 308
U.S. 188 (1939) ; Hinton v. Columbia River Packers Association, 131 F.2d 89 (9th
Cir. 1942).
115. Anore Amusement Corporation v. Doe, 171 Misc. 279, 12 N.Y.S.2d 400

(Sup. Ct. 1939).

116. Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948),

granted, 336 U.S. 996 (1949).

cert.

117. 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E.2d 12 (1947).
118. 274 App. Div. 169, 80 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1st Dep't 1948).
119. Cf. Allen Bradley v. Local #3, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) (area monopoly achieved without use of picketing).
120. In United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), the Court laid down
the dictum that labor's concerted action is protected from the Sherman Act so long
as labor groups do not unite with non-labor groups. But the protection offered by
the Hutcheson dictum, as a matter of federal law, is broader than that which the

states are bound by the 14th Amendment to provide.
121. 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
122. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
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Both the Ritter and the Giboney cases indicate that the test set forth
in Bridges v. California12 3 for free speech cases generally will not be
applied in picketing cases. Picketing, this combination of speech and
patrol used as a weapon of economic warfare, is entitled to some lesser
degree of protection.J 24 The test used for limiting free speech in the
Bridges case can be broken into two components. First, the substantive
evil must be extremely serious. Second, the degree of its imminence must
be extremely high. The first part of the Bridges test is modified in the
Giboney case to a condition less strict. The Court declares that placards
used as an essential and inseparable part of a grave offense against an
important law can be enjoined: where a state enacts legislation to regulate economic affairs or industrial relations, it has power to enjoin picketing the sole object of which is to frustrate state policy. Thus, picketing
to secure a union shop or to oust a certified bargaining agent where it is
unlawful for the employer to comply would seem to be enjoinable on the
rationale of the Giboney case. But where picketing is engaged in for several purposes, as where organizational pickets demand a union shop, every
effort should be made to protect the lawful component.
How imminent must the danger be? In the Giboney case, the Court
observes that 85% of the unionized drivers employed by Empire's customers refused to cross the picket line. Mr. Justice Black speaks of the
danger as clear, imminent, and immediate, and the power of the defendant
union and its allies is termed irresistible. It seems that the Court has
erected a test of imminence based on the volume of business lost by the
employer. The degree of imminence may depend as much on the obstinacy of the employer or his financial capacity to withstand pressure.
If his injury is de minimis, the employer should certainly not be granted
relief. But, it is submitted, if his loss is substantial, even though it may
not reach the 85% loss suffered by Empire or the 60% suffered by Ritter,
picketing the sole object of which is to induce the employer to violate a
statute should be enjoinable.
The unlawful purpose test has thus reappeared in modern garb. But
now the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of what purposes a state can
declare unlawful. Picketing is now prima facie constitutionally protected.
If the purpose of the picketing is at all reasonably related to working conditions, it is unlikely that state courts can enjoin picketing on the basis
of their common law. State legislatures, however, can go farther, and
herein lies a potentially great threat to effective future protection for peaceful picketing. The Giboney case may very well be interpreted by state
courts to mean that they are relatively free to enjoin picketing for purposes which they label as unlawful so long as they "find" a statute upon
which to rest their decision. Even if the court granting the injunction
does not rely on a statute, the appellate court can remedy this by affirming
on the basis of a statute. Thus, what is essentially a common law injunction is converted by a type of judicial magic into a "clear manifestation
of legislative policy." The Holmesian tradition is then invoked: the Court
must exercise great judicial restraint in nullifying state legislation!
Of course, only future decisions will reveal whether the Court will
faithfully adhere to the Giboney case. The important role played by union
sanctions may make the picketing in the Giboney case readily distinguishable as essentially non-speech. The recent grant of certiorari in several
123. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
124. See Ex parte Blaney, 30 Cal. 2d 643, 648, 184 P.2d 892, 896 (1947).
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picketing cases should be noted by all who have an interest in this subject. 1 25 The present term of the Court may very well solve many of the
problems that have been probed in this Note.
D.E.P.

Suspicion Versus Conviction in the Commissioner's Computation of
Income: The Adequacy of Records Under Section 41 of the
Internal Revenue Code
Tax laws, unfortunately, must be enforced to protect the revenue and
to assure that the burden of taxation will be uniformly and equally borne.
In pursuance of that premise, the Bureau of Internal Revenue during the
1948 fiscal year collected over one billion dollars in additional income and
excess profits taxes from 345,904 taxpayers. In only 1.2% of those cases
did the taxpayer litigate the Commissioner's assessment.1 Whether such a
small percentage indicates that most taxpayers felt the assessment was
proper or merely too futile or expensive to contest is a moot question. The
sheer size of the amount which must be collected through enforcement
activities, nevertheless, makes pertinent an inquiry into the methods and
authority by which at least a part of such additional taxes are computed.
It is the purpose of this Note to consider the nature of the requirement that
taxpayers be able to verify their returns and to examine the limitations on
the Commissioner of 2 Internal Revenue's discretion to determine income
by arbitrary methods.
STATUTORY CRITERIA FOR THE COMPUTATION OF INCOME

Initially each taxpayer is under a duty to file a return annually, to
supply all information requested on the form, to compute his income, to
iassess himself, and to pay the tax. 3 Although a presumption of correctness
might be thought by a layman to attach to these initial returns, the mere
scope of enforcement activities belies such a belief.4 The returns are subject to audit and review 5 and when questioned must be substantiated by
proof of their correctness.0 Adequate proof primarily means adequate rec-7
ords and the use of a method of computation which clearly reflects income.
125. Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948), cert.
granted, 336 U.S. 996 (1949) ; Hanke v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 207
P.2d 206 (Wash. 1949), cert. granted, 70 Sup. Ct. 305 (1949) ; Gazzam v. Building
Service Employees Union, 29 Wash. 2d 488, 188 P.2d 97 (1947), 207 P.2d 699
(Wash. 1949), cert. granted, 70 Sup. Ct. 308 (1949); Cline v. Auto Drivers and
Demonstrators Union, 207 P.2d 216 (Wash. 1949), cert. granted, 70 Sup. Ct. 305

(1949).

1. REP. COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE 29 (1948).
2. Compare Wolder, Limitations on the Comnissioner's Power to Determine
Income by Arbitrary Methods, 27 TAXES 22 (1949).

3.

NT. REV. CODE §§ 51, 52, 53, 56.
4. Mitchell, Tax Administration: Objectives, Metlwds, and Tests of Adequacy,
PROCEEDINGS, FORTY-FIRST CONFERENCE NAT. TAX Ass'N 48 (1948).
5. INT. REV. CODE § 57.
6. INT. REV. CODE § 36 14 (a). Revenue agents are the primary fact finders of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and have broad authority to examine records.
7. Taxpayers must keep books. INT. REV. CODE §§ 41, 54. A wilful failure to
keep books is a misdemeanor, § 145 (a). If a deficiency is due to negligent failure to
keep books, 59 of the deficiency is payable as a penalty, § 293(a).
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Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code, providing for methods by
which net income shall be computed, grants to the Commissioner authority
to determine: (a) if a taxpayer's books and methods of accounting "clearly
reflect income," and if not or if a taxpayer did not keep records, (b) to
compute his income "in accordance with such method as in the opinion of
the Commissioner does clearly reflect income." 8 Because of the breadth
of this grant of discretionary authority, a distinction must be made between
two types of problems which may arise under this section. This Note is concerned with the problem of whether the taxpayer had more income or less
expense than he reported, 9 and the extent to which the Commissioner may
disregard those records which he has kept, rather than with the relative
merits of tax accounting as compared with general accounting principles
and the perennial problems of when items become income or expense. 10
The statute is clear and the regulations recognize that if a taxpayer's
books and method of accounting clearly reflect his income they must be
used to compute his tax liability." Furthermore, it may be said generally
that books which reflect actual yearly transactions and net income plainly
and honestly, even if not exactly or precisely,' 2 under a consistent plan in
accord with the custom and necessities of taxpayer's business come within
the statutory mandate.' 3 But will any method clearly reflect income of the
taxpayer who has kept no books, or who has kept them carelessly, or whose
accurate books have been lost or destroyed during the inevitable lag between
the time the taxpayer files his return and the time a revenue agent starts
asking questions? Under these circumstances the real issue is whether the
Commissioner's method clearly reflects the taxpayer's income. If the Commissioner, who is in reality thousands of revenue agents, does not feel that
the taxpayer's records or explanations are adequate, he will compute the
taxpayer's income, using any one of the methods hereinafter discussed; and
if as a result of such computation, based on whatever traces of income he is
able to discover, the Commissioner determines a greater amount of income
than the taxpayer reported, he will assess a deficiency tax 14 which operates
as an adjudication. 15 The taxpayer may either pay the additional tax and
17
sue for a refund in a district court 16 or appeal directly to the Tax Court.
Thus the question of whether the taxpayer's method of computation clearly
reflects income is summarily determined in the first instance by the Commissioner. Only by appeal to the Tax Court or by suing for refund can
the taxpayer question the Commissioner's computation or his refusal to
8. "Net income shall be computed . . . in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer; but if no such
method of accounting has been so employed, or if the method employed does not clearly
reflect the income, the computation shall be made in accordance with such method as
in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income." INT. REV.
CODE § 41.

9. Neth v. Commissioner, 8 CCH TC MEM. DEC. .16,796 (1949).
10. For discussion of these problems, see Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193
(1934) ; South Dade Farms v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943) ; Seghers,
Tax Accounting Compared with Recognized Accounting Principles, 1 NAT. TAX 3.
341 (1948).
11. Huntington Securities Corp. v. Busey, 112 F.*2d 368 (6th Cir. 1940); U.S.
Treas. Reg. 111, §29.41-1-3 (1943).
12. Huntington Securities Corp. v. Busey, supra note 11.
13. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.41-1-3 (1943) ; National Airlines, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 9 T.C. 159 (1947).
14. INT. REV. CODE §§272(a) (1), 3654.
15. Taylor v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1934).
16. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340, 1346(a), 1391(b), 1402(a), 1491 (Cong. Serv. 1948);
INT. REV. CODE § 3772.
17. INT. REV. CODE

§272(a) (1).
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accept the taxpayer's books and method of computation. In either event
he does not have an easy road to travel. Doubts are not resolved in favor
of the taxpayer.' 8
No analysis of the extent of the Commissioner's discretion and the
methods he has used to compute income is possible without an understanding of the procedural context in which they arise and are tested.
Presumptionsand Burden of Proof Rule.-Because taxpayers are more
familiar with the facts on which their returns are based, the Supreme Court
in an early decision held that the Commissioner's assessment is prima facie
evidence of the amount due as taxes. 19 The Board of Tax Appeals
formerly held that the taxpayer not only has the burden of proving that the
Commissioner's assessment was erroneous, but also of proving the correct
amount of taxes.20 The Supreme Court has since held, however, that, before the Tax Court, it is sufficient if the taxpayer prove the Commissioner's
determination to be wrong.2 ' If the taxpayer chooses to pay the tax and sue
for refund, however, he must still prove not only error, but also the correct
amount of taxes due, on the theory that he is seeking an affirmative money
judgment.2 2 So far as the deficiency is concerned, this burden
23 is on the
.
taxpayer even though he is also charged with fraud or evasion.
The presumptive correctness of the Commissioner's determination and
the consequent burden on the taxpayer mean that the taxpayer not only has
the burden of introducing evidence, but also the burden of convincing the
tribunal that his facts exist; if the evidence is in balance, he loses.24 The
presumption in favor of the Commissioner does not disappear when relevant
evidence is introduced, but is treated as evidence and weighed against
opposing evidence. 25 The taxpayer, therefore, must demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that the Commissioner is wrong. 26 Unsupported
testimony, conclusions and opinions based on memory,2 7 or mathematical
18. Hague Estate v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1943), affirming 45
B.T.A. 104 (1941); ef. Dayton Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 767, 772 (8th Cir.
1937); Fernald, Federal Tax Administration, PROCEEDINGS, THIRTY-SEVENTH CoNFERmcE NAT. TAX Ass'x 97 (1944).
19. United States v. Rindskopf, 105 U.S. 418 (1881).
20. Parker v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 1185 (1929).
21. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1934). The Commissioner's determination is prima facie correct. RULES OF PRACTICE BEFORE THE TAX COURT OF THE
U.S., Rule 32 (1948).
22. See Taylor v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 619, 621 (2d Cir. 1934).
23. In fraud cases two issues are involved: (1) Is there a deficiency? (2) Is it
the result of fraud? As to the former the Commissioner is presumptively correct,
but he must affirmatively prove fraud in order to impose the 50% penalty. INT. REV.
CODE § 293(b). It is also to be noted, however, that the statute of limitations may
prevent collection of the deficiency unless fraud is shown. INT. REV. CODE §§ 275 (a),
276(a); Cohen v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 1156 (1947); Spencer, Proof of Income
Tax Fraud, 2 TAX L. REv. 451 (1947).
24. Bishoff v. Commissioner, 27 F.2d 91 (3rd Cir. 1928), affirming 6 B.T.A.
570 (1927); .offman, Overcominig the Prima-Facie Preumpton of Correctness ol
the Commissioner's Determination,4 INSTITUTE FED. TAx. 240 (1946).
25. Lincoln v. French, 105 U.S. 614 (1881) (presumption in favor of the Commissioner a rule of evidence to supply the place of facts) ; Budd v. Commissioner, 43
F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1930) ; Minyard v. Commissioner, 6 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 1137
(1947) ; Hoffman, supra note 24, at 240.
26. National Weeklies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1943);
Wells v. Moore, 94 F.2d 108 (6th Cir. 1938); Halle v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 245
(1946) ; Freebourn v. Commissioner, P-H 1944 TC MEM. DEc. 144,209 (1944).
27. Hague Estate v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1943), affirming 45
B.T.A. 104 (1941); Bishoff v. Commissioner, 27 F.2d 91 (3rd Cir. 1928), afflrnizng
6 B.T.A. 570 (1927) ; Halle v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 245 (1946) ; Carmack v. Commissioner, 8 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 17,049 (1949).
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calculations based on uncertain facts are insufficient to prove error.28 Nor
will the Tax Court indulge in assumptions and speculations or hazard

guesses even though proof may be impossible. 29 Furthermore, because the
facts are usually within the taxpayer's knowledge, his failure to testify
creates a presumption that his testimony would have been unfavorable to
his cause. 30 As in the case of ordinary trials, however, many decisions turn
on such
implicit factors as the manner, appearance and credibility of wit31
nesses.
Although it is said that before the Tax Court the taxpayer merely has
the burden of proving error, in many cases, in practical effect, to do so he
must prove the correct amount of his income 32 or prove that his return
and the records he kept reflected all of his income. Presumptive validity
is accorded both the Commissioner's determination of the adequacy of the
taxpayer's records and method of accounting and his computation of the
taxpayer's income. Error may not be shown merely by proving the use
of a proper method of accounting as a literal reading of Section 41 would
seem to indicate. The taxpayer must also explain the amount computed by
the Commissioner as unreported income. 33 Here, in substance, the issue
is the truthfulness of the taxpayer's records and the burden remains on him
34
to prove his own honesty.

In such circumstances, suspicion could easily

replace conviction in the determination of deficiency assessments. As Judge
Learned Hand stated in Taylor v. Commissioner,35 the burden of proof
rule is "a rubric which has saved the Treasury many a doubtful case, but
which can easily be pushed to deny taxpayers privileges plainly theirs."
METHODS WHICH IN THE OPINION OF THE COMMISSIONER CLEARLY
REFLECT INCOME

The statutory requirement that a method which clearly reflects income
must be used by both taxpayer and Commissioner really has little precise
meaning. Whatever the reasons which prompt an investigation, 6 such as
unusual or inadequate explanation of deductions shown on the return, large
dissimilarities in income of similar businesses in the same locality, or leads
28. Calafato v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 881 (1940), aff'd, 124 F.2d 187 (3rd
Cir. 1941).

29. Burnet v. Houston, 283 U.S. 223 (1931) (if taxpayer cannot prove Commissioner wrong because of inadequate records, fault is his own); Hague Estate v.
Commissioner, supra note 26; Kenney v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.
1940), afirining, P-H 1938 BTA MEM. DEC. f38,266 (1938); Bishoff v. Commissioner, supra note 26; Awe v. Commissioner, 7 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 11519 (1948).
30. Cohen v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 1156 (1947) ; but not in a criminal case for
tax evasion, Gleckman v. United States, 80 F.2d 394, 402 (8th Cir. 1935).
31. Cohen v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 1156 (1947); Murray v. Commissioner, P-H
1945 T.C. MEm. DEC. ff 45,369 (1945); Kern v. Poe, 8 F. Supp. 942 (W.D. Wash.
1934) ("Men have been hung from time to time upon the word of their fellows
without support or corroboration from records or books of account").
32. Harris v. Commissioner, 7 CCH TC MEM. DEC. f1192 (1948) ; Hague Estate
v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 104 (1941), aff'd, 132 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Bishoff
v. Commissioner, 27 F.2d 91 (3rd Cir. 1928).
33. Although one may have kept records according to a proper method of accounting, the Commissioner may consider them inadequate if the nature of the entries
is not sufficiently self-explanatory or if supporting vouchers are not available. See,
e.g., Neth v. Commissioner, 8 CCH TC MEM. DEC. 1 16,796 (1949) ; Fairman v. Commissioner, 8 CCH TC METM. DEC. 44 1 16,578 (1949); McDonald v. Commissioner,
P-H 1944 T.C. MEm. DEC. 144,363 (1944).
34. Compare Neth v. Commissioner, sapra note 33, with Fairman v. Commissioner, supra note 33.
35. 70 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1934).
36. Spencer, Proof of Income Tax Fraud, 2 TAx L. REv. 451, 466 (1947).
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obtained from banks or neighbors 37 as to expenditures or investments
seemingly out of proportion to reported income, the methods used by the
Commissioner depend upon the exigencies of the particular case, and the
particular business involved. While their purpose is the same, to compute
taxpayer's income so as to determine if the taxpayer's report is correct, the
methods differ considerably according to the nature and source of the information used. Unlike ordinary methods of accounting, they do not attempt to reconstruct or reflect each transaction in which the taxpayer has
engaged. All, characteristically, are based predominantly on circumstantial evidence and inferences resulting from such objective facts as bank
deposits, increases in net worth, expenditures, or statistics of average income of like taxpayers. Although here characterized as mutually exclusive, in practice the methods overlap and the Commissioner may use whatever elements of each the facts of the particular case may necessitate. All
of the following methods have received judicial approval.
Percentage Method.-The percentage method is primarily used in the
case of taxpayers who have very many small transactions. It is based on
the taxpayer's gross sales or receipts; usually the figure reported on the
taxpayer's return is used. Income is computed by applying to such sum a
so-called percentage mark-up or gross profit margin. The percentage used
may be an average of the ratio of profits to sales determined from returns
of taxpayers engaged in the same kind of business; it may be the mark-up
allowed by state law; it is sometimes a pure guess.
In F. G. Bishoff v. Commissioner,38 for example, the taxpayer, a
credit-and-delivery grocer, filed income tax returns for 1918 and 1919 showing a net loss. Of the records which Bishoff kept, the only ones used in
filling out his returns were daily sales sheets. The value of inventories
was estimated as were also expenditures for merchandise and repairs.
Wages were computed for 1918 by multiplying their cost for December
by twelve. In 1924, the year of audit, all invoices, bills, receipts, credit
sales slips, and some checks and check stubs for the years in issue were
missing. The Commissioner, therefore, rejected the records as incomplete
and computed income by use of an average percentage table compiled by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue from 1919 returns of corporations engaged in the retail grocery business. The table classified the returns into
two categories, denominated gross sales and gross income, and divided
each category into three classes according to amount. Average percentages
representing the ratio of average gross income to average gross sales and
the ratio of average net income to average gross income were assigned to
each class. Thus, multiplying the taxpayer's gross sales by the percentage
representing average gross income, the Commissioner computed probable
gross income, to which sum the percentage representing average net income
was applied to determine probable net income.3 9
The method has no pretension to accuracy. In computing the table
and formula no distinction was made between cash-and-carry and creditand-delivery stores. Nor were the returns used restricted to stores in
Bishoff's locality. The return of no corporation showing gross sales in
excess of $150,000 or showing losses was considered, although Bishoff's
37. Rewards are offered for information leading to the detection and punishment
of persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws. INT. REV. CODE § 3792.
38. 6 B.T.A. 570 (1927), aff'd, 27 F.2d 91 (3rd Cir. 1928).
39. Id. at 575. Bishoff reported gross sales for 1918 as $311,569. The Commissioner and the Board of Tax Appeals, without disclosing a reason, rejected that figure
and said it was at least $326,665.
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sales were over $300,000; nor had all the returns used been audited by
the Bureau. Since the percentages appearing on the table showed that
the ratio of profit to sales substantially decreased as gross sales increased,
serious error resulted from the use of percentages against Bishoff compiled from businesses enjoying only half of his sales volume. The percentage method thus rests on the assumption that, within his class, the
taxpayer has earned average profits; it makes no allowance for special
competitive circumstances or other local variables. Nevertheless, in the
Bishoff case the Board of Tax Appeals concluded from the evidence that it
could not tell whether the taxpayer had sustained a profit or a loss, and
it therefore accepted the Commissioner's determination. The Board thought
it insufficient to show that the Commissioner's method is unlikely to
reach a correct result in the absence of proof that the amount of income
was less than that determined by the Commissioner.
To the extent that taxpayers have been able to show that there is no
rational foundation for the average percentage adopted; 40 or that the surrounding circumstances are inconsistent with the income assigned to
them; 41 or insofar as the Tax Court attaches credibility to their explanation of the manner in which presently unavailable books were kept and
their testimony that returns reflected all income clearly, 42 arbitrary application of this method has been limited. The following cases are illustrative
of such limitations as well as the artificial results which this method may
produce.
In Ward v. Commissioner,43 the taxpayer operated two cut-rate liquor
stores. His records for the three tax years in question consisted of invoices, bank statements, cancelled checks and check stubs, and a small
notebook in which he entered weekly the total of daily sales, as shown
on his cash register, and weekly purchases and expense. Inventories were
taken yearly in compliance with the state floor stock tax. His returns were
based on the total of weekly sales, purchases and expenses reflected in this
book. Some invoices, checks, and bank statements which were stored in
the back room were accidentally thrown away when the room was cleaned
to store furniture. Because of the lack of supporting papers, the Commissioner disregarded Ward's books as inadequate to verify his returns.
Net income, more than double that reported by taxpayer, was computed by
adding to the cost of goods sold the percentage mark-up allowed by state
law and deducting therefrom the deductions which the taxpayer claimed
on his return. The evidence showed, however, that Ward was unable
to sell at the full mark-up allowed; that because of tie-in practices he was
forced to purchase off-brand goods which he sold at a loss; and that the
figure which the Commissioner used as the cost of goods sold included
excise taxes which, by state law, were required to be subtracted before
applying the mark-up allowed. The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's computation as inconsistent with the surrounding circumstances
and accepted Ward's returns as correct.
In William Stratman v. Commissioner,4" also, the Commissioner was
unable to verify the taxpayer's return from his books or to compute his
income on a net worth basis because he "could not find much net worth."
40. Ward v. Commissioner, 7 CCH TC MEm. DEC. f1505 (1948).
41. Stratman v. Commissioner, 8 CCH TC Mam. DEC. f117,032 (1949).
42. McCoy v. Commissioner, P-H 1946 TC MEm. DEC. 46,048 (1946); McDonald v. Commissioner, P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEC. 1144,363 (1944); Nahman v.
Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 121 (1930).
43. 7 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 1505 (1948).
44. 8 CCII TC MEm. DEC. 17,032 (1949).
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Accordingly, he applied the average mark-up used by taverns in the taxpayer's locality and allowed a certain percentage of sales as business expense deductions. But the evidence showed that Stratman never checked
cash receipts against the cash register tallies; that he sold his liquor at
cut-rate prices and often at cost; and that during the two years subsquent
to the tax years in issue, when his sons operated the tavern and kept
accurate books, the business yielded an income less than half that determined by the Commissioner. The Tax Court held on these facts that
Stratman was too poor to have had the income determined by the Commissioner.
H. M. McCoy v. Commissioner (three partners) and Frank McDonald v. Commissioner 45 clearly illustrate the issue of honesty which
these cases often present. The taxpayers in both cases operated race horse
betting establishments. Both maintained daily tally sheets compiled from
slips showing each bet taken, amounts paid winners, and each item of
expense paid. The McCoy partnership tally sheets also showed the size
of the daily beginning and closing bank roll, and the daily net gain or
loss from operations. At the end of the year the McCoy tally sheets were
given to an attorney for purposes of an accounting between the partners
and to make out their income tax returns. McDonald forwarded his
daily sheets to an accountant who made book records from them, and
thereafter destroyed the sheets to prevent possible use against him in any
criminal proceeding. The McCoy sheets were subsequently confiscated
by a sheriff and were also, therefore, unavailable to the Commissioner.
The Commissioner refused to accept McDonald's books without the slips
and concluded from conversations with the McCoy partners that their
returns were incorrect. He computed McDonald's income as ten per cent
of gross bets on the ground that parimutuel race tracks make ten per cent
on all bets. The McCoy partnership income was determined to be thirtyfive per cent of estimated gross receipts, that being the percentage used
in another case in which the revenue agent took part. Whatever deductions the taxpayers could remember were allowed. The convincing character of their explanations led the Tax Court to conclude that both taxpayers had shown that their records and, therefore their returns, reflected
income and that the Commissioner's determination was based on suspicion
and an arbitrary assumption of additional income without factual basis.
Accordingly, the assessment was expunged.
Finally, in Nahman v. Commissioner,46 the taxpayer and another
had engaged in an export brokerage business from 1919 to 1923. Their
books and returns for 1919 to 1921 were audited and found to reflect income. When the partnership was dissolved in 1924, the books for 1922
and 1923 were left at the former office and were not available to the Commissioner for audit in 1926. Disregarding the returns, the Commissioner
computed income by assuming a profit of two per cent of gross sales for
of Tax Appeals rejected the Commissioner's
those years. The Board
4
determination and said:

7

"Although the abandonment or destruction of the books of a taxpayer would in many cases raise a suspicion that they were destroyed
merely for the purpose of making it impossible to audit them, we are
45. P-H 1946 TC MEm. DEc. 46,048 (1946); P-H 1944 TC MEm. Dec.
44,363 (1944). But cf. Fairman v. Commissioner, 8 CCH TC MEII. DEC. 16,538
(1949).
46. 21 B.T.A. 121 (1930).
47. Id. at 123-24.
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convinced from a consideration of the entire record made in this proceeding that there was no ulterior motive on the part of petitioners.
. . . We are satisfied from the testimony of witnesses that the books
of account were carefully kept and that the returns filed reflected
the operations of the partnership. The basis of his [Commissioner's]
action apparently has been suspicion, not conviction."
When the method is allowed, it seems obvious that at most it is capable only of approximating the taxpayer's income. How close it comes
to accomplishing even that in any given case, however, is anyone's guess,
for in most cases, the figure which the taxpayer reports as his gross sales
is the only one employed in the computation which is personal to him.
A much more reasonable and relevant percentage would be the average
ratio of the taxpayer's gross income to gross sales in previous years. Although the courts have said that there must be some extraordinary cir48
cumstances to justify the use of this method,49
the lack of books clearly
reflecting income is sufficiently extraordinary.
Bank Deposit Method.-Income is determined on the basis of the
bank deposit method by adding together all of the taxpayer's deposits for
the year in issue which he is unable to identify as coming from a nonincome source. The result is then augmented by an estimate of living
expenses, on the theory that one is not likely to deposit all income, and
is reduced by the amount of the deductible expenses which the taxpayer is
able to verify, or deductions may sometimes be allowed in proportion to
gross income and deductions taken in previous years. 50 The method, of
course, is usable only for those taxpayers who deposit most of their receipts and primarily to determine whether a taxpayer received income from
any undisclosed sources.
In Johnson v. United States 5 the taxpayer operated an illegal gambling parlor for which he kept no records. The Commissioner determined income as the sum of his bank deposits, but made no allowance for
withdrawals which Johnson claimed to have redeposited. The taxpayer
testified that before each sporting event he withdrew a "bank roll" which
he redeposited plus or minus winnings or losses after the "pay-off." He
therefore claimed that all withdrawals should be deducted as business
expenses to prevent duplication of deposits. The Tax Court sustained the
Commissioner's determination and approved the disallowance of withdrawals as business expense because of insufficient identity of the payees.
52
A similar result was reached in Hague Estate v. Commissioner,
where the deceased taxpayer had kept no record of the source or reason
for large and frequent deposits and withdrawals. Although he had died
insolvent and his bank balances had never been greater than $19,000, all
deposits which the executor was unable to explain, averaging over $200,000
for each of the three taxable years before his death, were added to his
reported income and taxed. The facts showed that Hague lived extravagantly. The court conceded the validity of the argument that a deposit
48. It re Sheinman, 14 F.2d 323 (E.D. Pa. 1926).
49. David Welsch, 2 B.T.A. 64 (1925) (cited in In re Sheinman, supra note 48,
as Daniel Welch, 2 B.T.A. 364).
50. Oliver v. Commissioner, P-H 1942 BTA MEm. DEC. 142,567 (1942).
51. 39 F. Supp. 103 (Ct. Cl. 1941). Although a number of cases herein discussed
involve taxpayers whose activities are illegal, it is not to be inferred that the Bureau
is primarily concerned with such taxpayers.
52. 45 B.T.A. 104 (1941), aff'd, 132 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1943).
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is not per se indicative of income, but concluded that "deposits in checking
accounts are so often made up of income that where as here that is the
fair inference to be drawn from the facts it was proper to give it effect." 53
Both decisions show a refusal to speculate on the amount of actual losses
or non-income items.
That the method may be very harsh is clear from the questionable reliability of bank deposits as an index of income or business activity. Such
deposits may reflect kiting operations, 54 checks cashed to accommodate
friends or customers,5 5 currently deposited past savings,56 inheritances,5 7 gifts, loans and many other non-income items which may be difficult to trace and prove.58
Where the taxpayer is able to trace and explain his deposits, the use
of this method may result in the computation of gross income less than
that reported in the return. In two parallel cases, for example, books were
kept for all receipts and most disbursements connected with the operation
of rooming houses and the rental of real estate. 59 In both cases the Commissioner disregarded these books and computed income from bank deposits with an addition for estimated living expenses. This figure was
then reduced by an amount which the revenue agent considered to be nonincome deposits, all items of expense paid by check being allowed as deductions. The Tax Court found, however, that many other items which
the agent included as income deposits were non-income items, that gross
income reported by taxpayers exceeded their net deposits so adjusted, that
many of their expenses were paid in cash, and that their books substantially reflected their income.
To the extent that the fact of a deposit may be indicative of current
income, this method's greatest utility would seem to be the discovery of
income from unknown sources. 60 Where all sources of income are known,
however, its use is unreasonable; 61 nor is the Commissioner warranted
in increasing income in proportion to the amount of deposits for the first
quarter of the tax year in issue when there were in fact no subsequent
deposits.6 2

Insofar as it is based on existing facts personal to the tax-

payer, the bank deposit method is more reasonable than the percentage
method. Like that method, however, it must produce computations of
merely speculative accuracy; both are examples of administrative expediency which rely heavily on the burden of proof rule.
Annual Increase in Net Worth.-Where no considerable amount of
income or receipts are deposited in banks and there is no basis such as
sales or gross receipts upon which to apply the percentage method, the
Commissioner may determine income as the difference between net worth
at the beginning and close of the tax years in issue. This difference may
53. 132 F.2d 775, 777 (2d Cir. 1943).
54. Zuckerman v. Commissioner, P-H 1941 BTA MEm. DEC. 141,384 (1941).
55. Markley v. Commissioner, 7 CCH TC MEM. DEC. 198 (1948) ; Riseman v.
Commissioner, 6 CCH TC Maim. DEC. 873 (1947).
56. Minyard v. Commissioner, 6 CCH TC MEM. DEC. fl 1137 (1947).
57. Roberts v. Commissioner, 7 CCH TC MEM. DEC. 1599 (1948).
58. Harris v. Commissioner, 7 CCH TC MEII. DEc. 1820 (1948) (evidence of
transactions over a twenty-five year period shown to prove non-income source of
deposits).
59. P. H. Jackson v. Commissioner, 7 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 1507 (1948); R. U.
Jackson v. Commissioner, 7 CCH TC MEM. DEC. ff 523 (1948).
60. Gleckman v. U.S., 80 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1935).
61. Roberts v. Commissioner, supra note 57 (all sources of income stipulated).
62. Harris v. Commissioner, 7 CCH TC MEM. DEc. 1820 (1948); Bloom v.
Commissioner, 7 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 1517 (1948).
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include currently acquired assets such as securities, automobiles, furniture,
buildings, the increment by which bank balances have increased, and any
other of the variety of forms in which wealth manifests itself, augmented
by estimated vacation expenditures, gifts made by the taxpayer and estimated personal expenses. Its accuracy as a reflection of income depends
on the scope of the Commissioner's investigation and the accuracy of the
figure representing the taxpayer's beginning net worth. The difficulty in
proving error here is somewhat the same as in the case of bank deposits,
where the taxpayer lacks records to prove that current assets were derived
from former savings. Often evidence of transactions in many years other
than those in issue must be submitted. Where it is not evident what
tax year,
amount of taxpayer's increased net worth is attributable to each
03
the sum may be apportioned equally among the years in issue.
In Louis Halle v. Commissioner64 the Commissioner added to reported
gross income for each of ten years substantial sums which constituted the
difference in the taxpayer's and his wife's bank balances and brokerage accounts at the beginning and close of each year after eliminating the sum
reported as income and all duplications which were identified as not representing income. Halle kept no records, and his sworn statement that
his returns were correct was held insufficient to overcome the Commissioner's presumptive correctness.
Again, in three cases involving taxpayers whose primary source of
income was gambling, each taxpayer claimed that most of the items the
Commissioner included as evidence of increased wealth were due to the
conversion of large sums of cash possessed prior to the years in issue. In
two 65 of the cases the Tax Court held that evidence of frugal living
habits negatived any fair inference of the possession of such large sums,
and in the third 6 6 that although circumstances indicated a very great probability that the taxpayer possessed the cash previously, his case was not
strong enough to show error in the Commissioner's computation: selfserving testimony must be substantiated by proof that currently acquired
assets were derived from prior savings.
Unsupported testimony if believed or when coupled with evidene of
thriftiness is infrequently sufficient, however, to rebut the Commissioner's
finding of increased net worth not reflected in taxpayer's books. 67 Moreover, as the following two cases show, an alleged increase in net worth
may be unexplained solely because of the Commissioner's incredulousness.
6
8 the Commissioner denied the deThus, in Max Jacobs v. Commissioner,
ductibility of and added to income large withdrawals of cash checks from
a bank account. These checks were endorsed by the taxpayer and his
employee, or by his employee alone, or by the taxpayer and Western
Union Co., or by the taxpayer and another "bookie," and were explained
as payments of wages to people who placed bets with him. The Tax Court
conceded the validity of Jacobs' explanation. Again, in William Neth v.
63. Mazzocone v. Commissioner, 7 CCH TC Mzm. DEc. ][ 298 (1948) (one-third
of the deficiency added to the taxpayer's reported income for each of the three years
in issue).
64. 7 T.C. 245 (1946) ; cf. Hoefle v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1940).
65. Carmack v. Commissioner, 8 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 117,049 (1949); Ferris
v. Commissioner, P-H 1944 BTA MEm. DEC. 44,336 (1944).
66. Kenney v. Commissioner, P-H 1938 BTA MEm. DEC. 138,266 (1938), aff'd,
111 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1940).
67. Marinaccio v. Commissioner, 8 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 1f16,910 (1949); Neth
v. Commissioner, 8 CCH TC MEM. DEC. 1f16,796 (1949).
68. P-H 1942 BTA MEM. DEC. 142,086 (1942).
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Commissioner69 the income and expenses of the taxpayer's bakery were
reflected in a small notebook. Because no records were available to explain the source of certain bank deposits and of funds used to acquire
real estate, the Commissioner rejected the notebook as inadequate. The
taxpayer claimed that the funds were derived from accumulated savings
previously hidden in a closet. Stating the issue as "whether or not the
petitioner had income . . . other than that reported in his income tax
return," the Tax Court said it was convinced of the taxpayer's truthfulness.
So far as a comparison of the relative merits of the various methods
thus far discussed is of any value, the instant method would appear to be
fairer from a taxpayer's point of view in that it is based on ascertained
wealth rather than on the possibility of income from the fact of bank deposits or gross sales. Like the other methods, it again emphasizes the
necessity of keeping adequate records if harsh results are to be avoided.
Excess Cash Expenditures.-In Max Cohen v. Commissioner70 the
taxpayer kept no records of income received from slot machines, liquor or
gambling business, or of income received as a "protection" racketeer during the tax years 1936 through 1943. The Commissioner computed income by adding to the cash on hand at the beginning of each year all
ascertainable cash receipts. He then aggregated all cash expenditures made
by the taxpayer in his various enterprises and from the figure so obtained
deducted the figure of cash on hand and ascertained receipts. The difference between the two figures was added to Cohen's reported income and
taxed. In a companion case, R. L. Carnahanv. Commissioner,71 where the
taxpayer was Cohen's partner, there apparently was no other evidence than
the existence of the partnership upon which to compute income. The
Commissioner therefore added the sum denominated "excess cash expenditures" in the Cohen case to Carnahan's reported income as "income not
reported" on the assumption that he received equal amounts from the
same sources as Cohen. Lacking records, the taxpayers were unable to
sustain their claim of loans and gambling losses. Little weight was given
to the testimony of witnesses from the "lawless fringe of society," and the
failure of Cohen to testify gave rise to a presumption that his testimony
would have been unfavorable to his claim.
One is unable to say that the method is arbitrary inasmuch as it does
rest on a finding of expenditures which would not have been possible if
the taxpayer received only the income he reported.
Judicial Guess.-A judicial guess is not a method in the sense of a
system used to compute income, but it is an implicit element in the application of other methods where estimates become necessary. It has also
been used explicitly to grant relief to taxpayers who, because of the lack
of records, are unable to prove expenses otherwise deductible. Thus in
George M. Cohan v. Commissioner,72 where the Commissioner and the
Board of Tax Appeals refused to allow any deduction for substantial
entertainment and traveling expenses, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit remanded, saying:
". . . we do not know how many trips Cohan made, nor how large
his entertainments were; yet there was obviously some basis for com69. 8 CCH TC MEm. DEC.

1 16,796 (1949).

70. 9 T.C. 1156 (1947).
71. 9 T.C. 1206 (1947).
72. 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930), revlg 11 B.T.A. 743 (1928).
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putation, if necessary by drawing upon the Board's personal estimates of the minimum of such expenses. The amount may be trivial
and unsatisfactory, but there was basis for some allowance. . . . It
is not fatal that the result will inevitably be speculative; many important decisions must be such." 73
of some
This sanction accounts for the seemingly arbitrary allowance
74
but not all deductions claimed where taxpayers have no records.
CONCLUSION
The methods used by the Commissioner do not clearly reflect income.
They represent administratively convenient and feasible methods of discovering traces of, and therefore the possibility of, income, leaving to the
taxpayer the burden of disproving the crude computation. The result
may be harsh, but where the taxpayer has kept inadequate books or no
books at all, the use of such methods seems entirely necessary, if returns
are to be verified and the use of biased guesses and estimates in making
out returns is to be discouraged. Whatever harshness results, however,
does seem to be unnecessarily enhanced by the usually long delay preceding inquiry by the Commissioner and the consequent increased difficulty for the taxpayer of proving error. Furthermore, much to be desired
is an increased educational campaign to inform taxpayers of the necessity
of maintaining accurate records and of the proper method of keeping them.
It is evident, also, that even though one has kept records and used a
proper method of accounting, the Commissioner may find them inadequate
if supporting vouchers or proof of the source of currently held assets are
unavailable. Such a finding is equivalent to a disbelief in the taxpayer's
honesty. It is questionable whether administrative convenience and difficulty of proof are sufficient justification for according presumptive validity
to deficiency assessments resulting from such suspicion as is presently
thought sufficient.
Because the problem is factual and requires the use of inferences and
presumptions, some arbitrariness is unavoidable. Judgments will differ and
administrative zeal may produce unwarranted suspiciousness and incredulousness. An examination of many cases, however, reveals definite limitations on how far the Commissioner may go in computing income. They
may be summarized as follows:
1. The Commissioner, in determining whether the taxpayer's books
and method of accounting clearly reflect income, cannot sacrifice
facts to theory. If one does have adequate records they must
be used.
2. The Commissioner's computation and additions to income must be
based on ascertained facts indicative of the receipt of income, such
as unexplained increases in assets or bank deposits, and not mere
suspicion. An arbitrary determination is not prima facie correct.
3. The tenor of the opinions indicates the Tax Court's readiness to
accept as correct the returns of taxpayers who show that their
books or supporting vouchers were accidentally lost or destroyed
and were kept according to a proper method of accounting.
73. Id. at 544.
74. Truman v. Commissioner, 8 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 16,819 (1949) (taxpayer
claimed expenses of $49,000, none of which was proved; Commissioner disallowed
$10,000 as excessive and unsubstantiated); Neilson v. Commissioner, 7 CCH TC
MEm. DEc. 116,595 (1948).
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4. A failure to keep books does not always of itself warrant disregarding the taxpayer's testimony. The significance of a failure to
keep books depends upon the individual, his qualifications, and the
other surrounding circumstances.
J. W. B.

Appealability of Rulings on Motion for New Trial in the
Federal Courts
Judicial control over the jury in the form of the motion for new trial
emerged in the seventeenth century to review excessive damages 1 and was
extended in the eightenth century to cover all kinds of jury errors. 2 Prior
to that time, jurors decided the facts of a case on their own knowledge,
instead of relying on evidence elicited from witnesses produced and examined in open court.3 Accordingly, the judges could not know the basis
for the jury's decision and were unable to rule on the weight or sufficiency
of the evidence. If a verdict was thought to be false, the only remedy
lay in the writ of attaint directed against the jurors. 4 The modern practice began to evolve only after the jury system was revised to require that
jurors base their verdict solely upon evidence produced at the trial.
At common law, the motion for new trial was heard by the trial court
en banc. There was no further review of the ruling on writ of error,
but since the motion had been originally considered by the court en banc, it
represented the consensus of judges who bad not sat at the trial, and constituted in effect a quasi-appellate review. 5 In the United States courts,
a single trial judge has always ruled on motions for new trial, although
there was an early attempt to establish a hearing by the court en banc. 6
Quasi-appellate review, therefore, has never existed, and consequently a
need for appellate review of such rulings has come into being, at least
in some situations. There have, however, been serious objections raised
which have impeded the development of a coherent and comprehensive practice of review. These will be discussed in connection with the situations
to which they have relevance; two general objections to review may, however, be mentioned preliminarily. Historically the writ of error searched
only 7 the record of process, pleadings, verdict and judgment for error of
law. The bill of exceptions to the judge's rulings during the course of
the trial was made a part of the record at an early date,8 but did not
1. Wood v. Gunston, Style 466, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (K.B. 1655).
2. By the middle of the 18th century the power of the court en bane to grant new
trials for all sorts of errors and mistakes on the part of the jury was firmly established. Berks v. Mason, Sayer 264, 96 Eng. Rep. 874 (K.B. 1756) ; Note, 1 U. or
CHI. L. REv. 111. 112 (1933). Errors of the judge and jury are now corrected on
motion for new trial. FED. R. Crv. P. 59(a); 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3243
(1938).
3. 1 HOLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 333 (3d ed. 1923).
4. Bushell's Case, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
5. See Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 482 (1933).
6. Note, 1 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 111, 113 (1933).
7. See Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co., 40 F.2d 463, 464 (2d Cir. 1930). The
writ of error at common law also searched for certain errors "in fact." This category
had nothing to do with fact findings of a jury. Typical errors "in fact" were (1)
death of a party before judgment, (2) allegations that the plaintiff below who appeared by attorney was a minor and should have appeared by guardian. Note, 32 COL.
L. REv. 860, 864 (1932).
8. See Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co., 40 F.2d 463, 464 (2d Cir. 1930).
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include the ruling on motion for new trial which was made after the
trial had ended. It had been objected, therefore, that the appellate court
could not review such rulings, 9 but in 1933 the Supreme Court expressly
disapproved this argument for the denial of review, on the ground that the
record before the appellate court has been enlarged to include in the bill
of exceptions the motion for new trial, made either before or after judgment. 10 It has also been frequently asserted that the trial judge has sole
discretion in his ruling on motion for new trial," but many cases hold
that if the trial judge abuses his discretion, he is subject to correction.' 2
These generalities cannot be reconciled.
Preliminarily, also, it should be remembered that appeals in the federal courts may only be taken from final judgments. 13 This means that a
denial of a motion for new trial may be appealed at once, but that where
a new trial has been granted, the ruling cannot be reviewed until the second verdict and judgment have been entered. 14 In the Third Circuit,
anomalous cases permitting direct appeal from the grant of a new trial were
expressly overruled in 1940.'5
When a party asks an appellate court to review a ruling on motion
for new trial, his attack will fall into one of three general categories: (1)
failure of the trial judge to exercise his discretion in dealing with the
motion; (2) commission of an error of law by the trial judge; and (3)
commission of an error of fact (a) by the jury or (b) by the trial
judge. This Note will describe the extent to which review has been allowed in the federal courts, with emphasis on the ground of excessive or
inadequate damages.
FAILURE OF TRIAL JUDGE TO EXERCISE DISCRETION

The trial judge's failure to exercise his discretion, a species of error
of law, has generally been allowed as a ground of review. In Dwyer v.
United States,16 for example, the trial judge failed to act on a motion for
new trial presented in chambers because he mistakenly thought he lacked
authority to grant it except in court. Again, where the trial court refused
to grant a new trial because it thought its function was merely to search
the sufficiency of the evidence rather than to weigh it, the appellate court
declared that the trial judge's refusal to consider the evidence by the
proper standard deprives the unsuccessful party of a right, so that the
refusal may be corrected on writ of error.17 The cases do not use the
9. Ibid.
10. Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474 (1933).
11. Arkansas Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889).
12. Beck v. Wings Field, 122 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1941).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 106.01; Bass v. Baltimore & 0. Term. R.R., 142 F.2d 779
(7th Cir. 1944).
14. Hunt v. United States, 53 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1931) ; cf. Howell v. Terminal
Ass'n, 155 F.2d 807 (8th Cir. 1946) (no appeal from the grant of a new trial allowed
even though part of the judgment final).
15. In Frank Mercantile Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 115 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1940),
the court refused to review the grant of a new trial because there had been no final
judgment rendered, and expressly overruled the following cases where such review
had been allowed in that circuit: Cottingham v. Hershey, 71 F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 1934) ;
James v. Evans, 149 Fed. 136 (3d Cir. 1906). State legislatures have enacted statutes
permitting immediate review of grants of new trials. E.g., CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 963
(Deering, 1941); N.Y. CiV. PROC. Acr §§588, 609 (Cahill, 1931).
16. 170 Fed. 160 (9th Cir. 1909).
17. Felton v. Spiro, 78 Fed. 576 (6th Cir. 1897), cited as controlling in Capital
Transit Co. v. Crusade, 68 A.2d 207 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1949) ; cf. General American Life Ins. Co. v. Central Nat. Bank, 136 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1943).
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phrase "failure to exercise discretion" in a strict sense. In Mattox v.
United States,18 for example, review was granted on the ground of the rejection of competent evidence during the hearing on the motion. Although
the court characterized the case as one of failure to exercise discretion,
it is clear that the trial judge acted positively, so that he really exercised
his discretion but erred in his interpretation of the law.
TRIAL JUDGe'S ERROR OF LAW

Review has also been granted where the trial judge is charged with
an error of law. The verbal formulation may be that of "abuse of discretion," 19 or "error of law," 20 with identical results. Although certain courts
give the impression that "abuse of discretion" is the sole ground for appealing a ruling on motion for new trial, others evidently see no discretion
involved in the failure to act in accordance with a legal duty.21 A typical
situation of error of law appeared in James v. Evans,2 2 where two defendants were sued for conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff. Following the trial
judge's charge to the jury that recovery could be had from both or either
of the defendants, a verdict against only one defendant was returned.
In the hearing on motion for new trial, however, the judge changed his
view of the law and ordered a new trial. This ruling was reversed
on appeal and judgment reinstated, on the ground that the charge to the
jury had expressed the correct rule of law.
Similarly, where a jury brings in a verdict for an amount in excess
of the statutory limit, the judge has a clear duty to set it aside, and
his failure to do so is an error of law which is reviewable.23 It has also
been held that where the amount of damages is not disputed, the trial judge
may not enter judgment upon a verdict for a lesser amount, 24 and that
since damages
are not in issue, no violation of the Seventh Amendment
25
occurs.

The thorny problem of distinguishing between the trial judge's errors
of law and the jury's errors of fact remains formidable. Some light is
thrown upon the position of the line of demarcation by Justice Brandeis'
opinion in Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co. 2 6 There the
defendant in a contract action had pleaded several defenses and a counterclaim, but the plaintiff's evidence of damages, which had "slight discrepancies," was substantially uncontroverted. The jury brought in a verdict
for plaintiff for one dollar, although a computation of the plaintiff's and the
18. 146 U.S. 140 (1892).

19. United Press Ass'ns v. National Newspapers Ass'n, 254 Fed. 284 (8th Cir.

1918); James v. Evans, 149 Fed. 136 (3d Cir. 1906).
20. Glenwood Irrigation Co. v. Vallery, 248 Fed. 483 (8th Cir. 1918) ; Frye v.
Lyon, 299 Fed. 926 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
21. Glenwood Irrigation Co. v. Vallery, note 20 supra.
22. 149 Fed. 136 (3d Cir. 1906).
23. See Southern Railway-Carolina Division v. Bennett, Adm'x, 233 U.S. 80, 87
(1914). Mr. Justice Holmes stated that in the absence of statute mere excess of a
verdict upon the evidence is a matter to be dealt with by the trial court. But see note
47 infra and text.
24. In Glenwood Irrigation Co. v. Vallery, 248 Fed. 483 (8th Cir. 1918), plaintiff brought an action to recover damages incurred when a trestle was destroyed by
fire alleged to have been set by defendant. There was no controversy as to the amount
of damages, yet the jury returned a verdict for a lesser amount. Held: Denial of
plaintiff's motion was a failure to carry out the duty of the trial court as required by
law. The same rule was later applied in a contract action. United Press Ass'ns v.

National Newspapers Ass'n, 254 Fed. 284 (8th Cir. 1918).
25. Glenwood Irrigation Co. v. Vallery, 248 Fed. 483 (8th Cir. 1918).
26. 287 U.S. 474 (1933).
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defendant's damages, on a basis most favorable to the latter, made it clear
that the plaintiff was entitled to approximately $18,250. The circuit court
accordingly reversed on the ground that an error of law was presented.
In the Supreme Court, however, the judgment was reinstated on the
ground that only an issue of fact was involved, and so no review was permissible. The majority reasoned that the award of nominal damages for
the plaintiff might have been made only because the jury wished costs to be
taxed against the defendant, and did not necessarily indicate a finding for
the plaintiff on the various substantive issues. But, as the dissent pointed
27
nor was the assessment of
out, the jury was not instructed as to costs,
costs its function. Therefore, the minority contended, this was an error
of law subject to review, especially because in a contract action like this
damages can be more readily ascertained than in tort cases, it having been
previously held that where the jury failed to ascertain tort damages which
were substantially uncontroverted, there could be correction in an appellate
court. The decision implied a very restrictive policy upon review of
rulings on motion for new trial,28 yet the actual holding is limited to cases
involving a verdict for nominal damages. Where there is a verdict for
more than nominal damages, although less than the amount shown by undisputed evidence, it is probable that the error of the jury and trial judge
is still to be considered one of law, since there can be no finding in that
situation that the jury merely wished to shift costs, but found the facts in
favor of the person paying the costs.
ERRORS OF FACT BY JURY OR TRIAL JUDGE

Will an appellate court review a ruling where the motion for new trial
was made on the ground of inadequate or excessive damages, or that the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence? Here an additional barrier to review is presented by the Seventh Amendment which provides
that ". . . no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law." 29 The main body of the Constitution provides that the Supreme
Court shall have jurisdiction both as to law and fact, 30 but because of fear
that this provision would take away the right to trial by jury, viewed as
the very symbol of freedom from autocratic power, 31 the Seventh Amendment was passed. The feeling was so strong that even in equity cases the
Supreme Court was at first allowed to re-examine the record only on writ
27. Id. at 486.
28. In Pugh v. Bluff City Excursion Co., 177 Fed. 399 (6th Cir. 1910) the jury
returned a verdict for plaintiff in a tort action for mmiwal damages. Plaintiff's proof
of damage was "not seriously disputed." The appellate court held that the refusal to
order a new trial was the violation of a positive duty. In the light of the Fairzount
case it would appear that this case is no longer law, unless the cases are distinguishable on the basis that in the Fairmount case several defenses were pleaded and there
was a counterclaim. See Note, 32 MIcH. L. Rxv. 387, 394 (1934). Compare Samuelson v. Central Nebraska Power and Irrigation Dist., 125 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1942)
where in a condemnation proceeding the jury returned a verdict for less than the
value testified to by witnesses for both sides, yet the appellate court refused to disturb
the finding, stating that in a condemnation proceeding a jury is not required to accept
as conclusive the estimate of value made by expert witnesses on either side.
29. U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. VII. The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 84, provided
that there should be no reversal on writ of error for error "in fact." This statute has
been often cited as precluding a review of fact conclusions of a trial court. See Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 481 (1933).
30. U.S. CoNsT. ART. III, § 2.

31. Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 190
(1937).
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of error. 32 Later Congress retreated from this extreme position, first
allowing the full equity appeal as it was known at common law,33 and then,
as at present, a re-examination of the facts in all non-jury cases.34 Of
course the lower court's findings, because of its proximity to the trial and
its opportunity to judge credibility, are controlling unless clearly erroneous. 35

In jury cases, on the other hand, the appellate courts are more

tightly bound and only the sufficiency of the evidence may be questioned
on appeal.3 6 In reviewing a motion for new trial on grounds of error of
fact, the appellate court must "weigh" evidence just like the trial judge in
order to see if he has abused his discretion. This is ostensibly looking for
more than "sufficiency" of the evidence, and broadens the traditional scope
of review for errors of fact. 37 Yet since at common law the motion for
new trial was heard by the court en banc, a quasi-appellate proceeding,
it would be substantially in conformity with the Seventh
Amendment to
38
have an appellate court review and weigh evidence.
The argument has also been made that in form and theory the appellate court reviews only the decision of the trial judge to see whether he
has abused his discretion in reviewing a finding of fact by the jury, and
does not review the verdict of the jury itself.L3 9 This view was rejected
by Judge Learned Hand in Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co. 40 In
refusing to review an order denying a motion for new trial made on
the ground of insufficient damages, he admitted that a weighing of factual
issues by an appellate court always occurs on a review of a ruling on motion for directed verdict, when the appellate court looks at the evidence.
But although he intimated the desirability of such a review in the case of the
motion for new trial, he thought it prohibited by precedent, not to be circumvented in the guise of a review for "abuse of discretion."
32. Note, 32 COL. L. Rav. 860, 865 (1932).
33. 2 STAT. 244 (1803).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ; 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 3118 (1938).
35. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 3118 (1938).

36. Id. at 3117.
37. In Baten v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 103 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1939), it was stated
that federal appellate courts do not directly review jury verdicts but only rulings of a
judge which may have affected the verdict, so that where defendants had failed to
move for a directed verdict the question of alleged insufficiency of the evidence would
not be considered. In Gaughan v. Michigan Interstate Motor Freight, 94 F.2d 266
(7th Cir. 1938), it was held that an appellate court will not substitute its judgment
concerning the weight of the evidence for the judgment of the jury where there is "substantial" evidence to uphold the verdict. It would appear, then, that appellate courts do
not "weigh" evidence. What is the difference between looking for "sufficiency" of
the evidence and "weighing" the evidence? In Felton v. Spiro, 78 Fed. 576 (6th Cir.
1897), Chief Justice Taft, then Circuit Judge, said, "Indeed

.

.:

. the mental process

in deciding a motion to direct a verdict is very different from that used in deciding
a motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence. In the former
there no weighing of plaintiff's evidence with defendant's. It is only an examination
into the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence to support a burden, ignoring defendant's
evidence. In the latter it is always a comparison of opposing proofs." Galloway v.
United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) may have broadened the scope of appellate review
where objection is made to a ruling on motion for directed verdict. Plaintiff sued the
United States on a war risk insurance policy, his right to recover depending on whether
he was totally and permanently disabled by reason of insanity on or before May 31, 1919,
the date his policy lapsed. The evidence was conflicting, but a verdict was directed
for the government and affirmed on appeal. The dissenting judges contended that
the appellate review had re-examined the testimony offered and weighed conflicting
evidence.
38. 32 MicH. L. Rav. 387, 391 (1934).
39. Blume, Review of Facts in Jury Cases-The Seventh Anenudtent, 20 J. Am'.
Jtm. Soc'y 130 (1936).
40. 40 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1930). Contra: Cobb v. Lepisto, 6 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.
1925).
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"The trial judge decides what verdict is within the grounds of reasonable inference from the evidence. That is a question which we can
consider as well as he, and which we do upon his direction of a
verdict. But by hypothesis we are not allowed to do that; we must
come at the matter at one remove, and apply the same test to the
judge's decision that he applies to the jury's. We must in effect decide whether it was within the bounds of tolerable conclusion to say
that the jury's verdict was within the bounds of tolerable conclusion.
To decide cases by such tenuous unrealities seems to us thoroughly undesirable; parties ought not be bound by gossamer strands; judges
ought not to engage in scholastic refinements." 41
Nevertheless, some chinks are visible in the judicial armor. In the
Fairmount Glass Works case, where the motion was grounded on the
award of inadequate damages, the Court stated, "The rule that this Court
will not review the action of a federal trial court in granting or denying
a motion for new trial for error of fact has been settled by a long and
unbroken line of decisions...
" 42 But Justice Brandeis, unlike Judge
Hand in the Miller case, expressly reserved the point whether there may
be review if the trial judge can be said to have abused his discretion, 43 bypassing it through a finding that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in the case. Would the Court, then, regard abuse of discretion on
a matter of fact as an error of law? If so, the possibility arises that facts
found by a jury may be reviewed on the ground that the trial judge
has abused his discretion in ruling on the motion for new trial.
Guilt or Liability.-It is probable that where the denial of the motion for new trial depends on the weight of the evidence in connection
with an issue of guilt or liability, the appellate courts will not review.
In United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co.,44 a prosecution for conspiracy under the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court stated emphatically,
"Certainly denial of a motion for new trial on grounds that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence would not be subject to review." The
Court did not even consider a possible abuse of discretion. Although this
was a criminal case, since one would expect to find the defendant's objections carefully considered, the same result would appear to be certain in a
civil action. A party may always, however, get an appellate review of the
evidence by moving for a directed verdict, 45 and excepting to its denial.
Damages.-On the problem of insufficient or excessive verdicts the
problem is acute. In the federal courts, if the evidence of damages is
controverted and the instructions of the trial judge to the jury are correct
as to the measure of damages, the power of passing on the reasonableness
of the amount of the jury's award of damages resides solely in the trial
judge in ruling on motion for new trial. No such error can be cited by
a party appealing from a grant or denial of a directed verdict since the
judge does not instruct as to amount of the damages but only as to
their measure.46 The only way in which the reasonableness of the amount
41. Id. at 465.
42. See Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 481 (1933).
43. Id. at 485.
44. 310 U.S. 150, 247 (1940); accord, Dairymen's Milk Co. v. McCormick Co.,
114 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1940).
45. See note 37 supra and text.
46. MCCORMicK, DAMAGES 75 (lst ed. 1935).

NOTES
of such a verdict can be presented to an appellate court, then, is from a
motion for new trial. Accordingly some circuits have liberalized their
practice where the jury brings in an excessive or insufficient verdict and
the trial judge refuses to order a new trial. In Virginia Ry. Co. v. Armentrout,47 Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit stated that the power to order

a new trial must be exercised unflinchingly, to prevent the jury system from
becoming an intolerable tyranny. Therefore, a refusal to set aside a
grossly excessive verdict constitutes an abuse of discretion which is reviewable error.
The Seventh Circuit has approached the problem in a unique way. In
Buchanan v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,48 an action under the Federal Employers Liability Act, a new trial was sought on the ground of insufficient
damages. Such actions provide especially broad scope to the jury, since the
rule of comparative negligence is used. Of such actions, the court said that
although, where no error of law appears, an appellate court cannot reverse
a judgment on the ground that the jury should have returned a verdict
for a larger amount, it can, if it thinks the verdict is not in accord with
the evidence, scan the trial more closely for error. This is a review of
jury findings by discovering errors of law which might ordinarily be overlooked.
In the Second Circuit, however, the rule announced by Judge Learned
Hand in Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co., long prevented any review of
rulings on motions based upon insufficient or excessive verdicts. In Powers v. Wilson, 49 decided in 1940, the court emphatically stated that on the

matter of excessive verdicts the trial judge's disposition of the motion
for new trial was final. The court refused to even consider whether his
action was an abuse of discretion. Recently, however, in Astles v. Quaker
City Bus Co.,50 the court has shown signs of a possible change in attitude.
There a defendant in a tort action moved for a new trial on the ground
of an excessive verdict. Although the court refused to review the denial
of the motion, citing the Maryland Casualty and Fairmount Glass Works
cases, it left the question open, as the Fairmount case did, on the matter
of whether there may be a review where there is an abuse of discretion.
The flat prohibition of review which was set forth in the Maryland
Casualty case then, may no longer be the law in the Second Circuit.
The use of the remittitur tends to mitigate the effect of a prohibition
of review in cases of excessive verdicts. 5' When a trial judge is not convinced that a new trial should be ordered, he may nevertheless condition
the order denying the motion on the plaintiff's remitting part of the verdict.
This does not violate the Seventh Amendment since remittiturs were
known at common law. 52 Since there is no additur in the federal courts
this possibility3 of compromise does not exist where there is an insufficient verdict.5
Facts Found During the Hearing.-Is a fact found by a trial judg
at a hearing on motion for new trial reviewable? United States v. John47. 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948) ; cf. Houston Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Kelley,
131 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1942).
48. 159 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1947).
49. 110 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1940), followed it Stornelli v. United States Gypsum
Co., 134 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1943).
50. 158 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1947).

51. See Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935).
52. Id. at 482.
53. Id. at 487.
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son,5 4 a criminal case, presents an interesting argument. The trial judge
found that a government witness had not committed perjury, the ground
urged, and denied the motion for new trial. But since the proofs were
mainly by conflicting affidavits and had to do primarily with matters and events subsequent to the trial, the court of appeals held that
it was in as good a position to evaluate the testimony as the trial court,
and accordingly reversed. The argument that the trial judge had seen
the alleged perjurer testify was dismissed because the trial judge had not
seen all persons who made affidavits which were considered on the motion, and hence it would have been improper for the trial court to consider
demeanor at all. On appeal to the Supreme Court, however, the court of
appeals was reversed, in part on the authority of the Fairmount Glass
Works case, which had involved facts found by a jury. By way of dictum
the Court indicated that where the findings of fact are wholly unsupported
by any evidence the appellate court may upset the trial judge's ruling. Thus
the Court permits only a very limited review of the evidence adduced at
the hearing, although the trial judge alone decides factual issues arising
on motion for new trial. In view of the freedom of review in nonjury
cases, this restriction appears anomalous. 55
A distinct rule exists where a trial judge finds as a fact that the jury
was influenced by passion and prejudice, in an action under the Federal
Employers Liability Act. Here the Supreme Court has held that a
remittitur may never be granted in place of a new trial.5 6 Assuming that
a trial judge's finding of fact may be reviewed, this raises the interesting
possibility that mere excessiveness of the verdict may give rise to a compulsory inference of passion and prejudice, thus furnishing another ground
for review of excessive verdicts. Even though review may be denied in the
ordinary case of excessive verdicts, where the jury's error is innocent, it
might be granted where the size of the verdict shows passion and prejudice
which the judge has failed to find.
CONCLUSION
The development of the law of appealability of motions for new trial
is another example of the practical evolution of the common law. While
the motion for new trial was in the nature of a separate type of appeal
before a court en banc there was little need for review, but when the
United States adopted the practice of having one judge rule on the motion
many felt a need for control by a higher tribunal. The way has been
blocked by many technicalities, some of which remain unremoved. But
the trend toward increased review is now unmistakable. 57 Review is now
generally allowed (1) where there is a failure by the trial judge to exercise
his discretion, and (2) where the trial judge commits error of law. With
regard to errors of fact by the jury, review has been limited very drastically.
Such restriction causes real injustice on the issue of excessive or inadequate
damages, since the matter cannot be otherwise presented for review. Review of errors of fact, when allowed, is concealed under the label of
trial judge's abuse of discretion. Realistically interpreted, such a formulation is an attempt to cloak a real examination of jury findings with the
familiar rule that the trial judge's errors of law will be reviewed.
54. 327 U.S. 106 (1946), reversing 149 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1945).
55. See note 34 supra and text.
56. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520 (1931).
57. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 59(d) (grounds for new trial required to be set out by
trial judge).

19501

NOTES

In England the development of the law has followed a different course.
The common law dogma that there could be no review of the ruling has
been superseded by statutes. Presently, the Judicature Act and the Rules
of Court of the English Court of Appeals give in effect the powers of a trial
court in dealing with a ruling on motion for new trial, and provide for
further review by the House of Lords. 8
In Pennsylvania, also, the courts are more liberal than the federal
courts in allowing a review of factual issues involving the weight of the
evidence, and excessive or inadequate damages. 59 In these cases, the
Pennsylvania courts will review the action of the lower court where it has
abused its discretion, although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
stated, ".

.

. one who asserts that a trial judge abused his discretion in

granting or refusing to grant a new trial, has a heavy burden to carry; too
heavy, indeed, unless he can show a clear abuse of discretion by the court
below." 60
It has been said that the aim of appellate review is two-fold: (1) to
settle and unify the law; (2) to see that justice is done in the individual
case.61 Perhaps the first aim has been overemphasized; admittedly the
appeal at law is ideal for this purpose. Substantial justice, however, is accomplished best in a type of review which looks at both law and fact.
This is the function of the motion for new trial. It is submitted that appellate courts should help to assure the doing of right in the individual case
by reviewing this important proceeding for all errors, both of law and
fact, by trial judge and jury.
R.V.S.
58. Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vicr., c. 77, Order 58(1) ; ANNUAL PRACTICE,
Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 (1933) ; Note, 1 U. OF CL L. REv. 111, 113 (1933).
59. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 680 (Purdon, 1931), provides "The motions for
new trials . . . which may be made and sustained before any one of the judges of
the said district court, shall be reserved by the said judges, and heard and decided by
the three judges of the said court, or any two of them, sitting together for that purpose." Although more than one judge rules on the motion for new trial in Pennsylvania, the ruling is still reviewable. Aaron v. Strausser, 360 Pa. 82, 59 A.2d 910 (1948)
(court will reverse trial judge's ruling on motion made on ground verdict against
weight of evidence only where abuse of discretion is clear) ; Patterson v. Pittsburgh
Railways Company, 136 Pa. Super. 432, 7 A.2d 478 (1939) (same rule in a case of
insufficient damages).
60. See Aaron v. Strausser, note 59 mtpra, at 88, 59 A.2d at 913.
61. Blume, Reziew of Facts in Jury Cases-The Seventh Amendment, 20 J. Am.
JUD. Soc'Y 130 (1936).

